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DETECTING COLLUSION IN TIMBER AUCTIONS: 
AN APPLICATION TO ROMANIA 
 
Abstract 
Romania was one of the first transition countries in Europe to introduce auctions for allocating 
standing timber (stumpage) in public forests.  In comparison with the former system in the 
country—administrative allocation at set prices—timber auctions offer several potential 
advantages: greater revenue generation for the government, a higher probability that tracts will 
be allocated to the firms that value them most highly, and stronger incentives for technological 
change within industry and efficiency gains in the public sector.  Competition is the key to 
realizing these advantages. Unfortunately, collusion among bidders often limits competition in 
timber auctions, including in well-established market economies such as the United States.  The 
result is that tracts sell below their fair market value, which undermines the advantages of 
auctions. 
This paper examines the Romanian auction system, with a focus on the use of 
econometric methods to detect collusion.  It begins by describing the historical development of 
the system and the principal steps in the auction process.  It then discusses the qualitative 
impacts of various economic and institutional factors, including collusion, on winning bids in 
different regions of the country.  This discussion draws on information from a combination of 
sources, including unstructured interviews conducted with government officials and company 
representatives during 2003.  Next, the paper summarizes key findings from the broader research 
literature on auctions, with an emphasis on empirical studies that have developed econometric 
methods for detecting collusion.  It then presents an application of such methods to timber 
auction data from two forest directorates in Romania, Neamt and Suceava.  This application 
confirms that data from Romanian timber auctions can be used to determine the likelihood of 
collusion, and it suggests that collusion reduced winning bids in Suceava in 2002 and perhaps 
also in Neamt.  The paper concludes with a discussion of actions that the government can take to 
reduce the incidence of collusion and minimize its impacts on auction outcomes.   3        
DETECTING COLLUSION IN TIMBER AUCTIONS: 
AN APPLICATION TO ROMANIA 
 
Introduction 
Romania was one of the first transition countries in Europe to introduce auctions for allocating 
harvesting rights for standing timber (stumpage) in public forests.  The auctions involve small 
tracts of forestland that must be harvested within a short period, typically less than a year from 
the date of the sale.  From this standpoint, the Romanian system is roughly similar to the system 
used in U.S. national forests.
1 
In comparison with the former system in the country—administrative allocation of timber 
at set prices—timber auctions offer several important advantages in principle.  From the 
standpoint of the government, the most obvious one is that auctions are likely to generate more 
revenues; in Romania; this was undoubtedly a primary impetus for introducing auctions.  But 
auction systems also have other potential advantages that may be more subtle but are arguably 
more important.  One is static efficiency in the forest sector: with auctions, tracts are more likely 
to be allocated to the firms that value them the most.  A second is dynamic efficiency: auctions 
are better at creating incentives for technological change, which is the ultimate engine of cost 
reductions in timber harvesting and wood processing; it will eventually allow firms to bid higher 
amounts.  A third is efficiency within the public sector.  Auctions for timber in Romanian state 
forests are administered by the National Forestry Administration (NFA).  This is a financially 
autonomous agency which, in addition to administering auctions, has responsibilities related to 
forest management, regulation, and extension.  It has 37 regional forest directorates (directia 
silvica).  Firms are allowed to participate in timber auctions in any forest directorate.  This 
choice creates an incentive for directorates to attract buyers by reducing bureaucratic hassles as 
well as other pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs of doing business. 
As this last point implies, competition is the key to the realization of the advantages of 
                                                 
1 It differs, however, from auction systems recently introduced in some other countries that are trying to create a 
more market-based forest sector.  An example is Cameroon, where auctions are being used to allocate long-term 
(15-year, renewable once) timber concessions that cover large areas of forest.   4        
auction systems. Unfortunately competition is often limited in timber auctions for a variety of 
reasons. One that has attracted regular attention in the United States since the 1960s is collusion 
(Mead 1967, Johnson 1979, Brannman 1996, Baldwin et al. 1997).
2 Collusion is a coalition of 
bidders who try to circumvent competition in order to obtain timber at a lower cost.  Such 
agreements are usually illegal, but detecting them can be difficult.  If collusion is a problem with 
timber auctions in the United States, an advanced market economy with well-developed legal 
institutions, it is likely to also be a problem in transition economies like Romania.  A previous 
econometric study on auctions in the Suceava forest directorate found evidence that winning bids 
were significantly lower for tracts with fewer bidders (HIID 1996).  Although this is by no 
means proof that bidders were colluding on those tracts,
3 it does indicate the important role of 
competition in determining the prices the NFA receives. 
This paper examines the Romanian auction system, and uses econometric methods to 
detect collusion.  The first and second sections describe the historical development of the system 
and the main steps in the auction process.  The third section describes the impact of economic 
and institutional factors on winning bids in different regions of the country; it includes a brief 
review of evidence on collusion.  Information in these first three sections comes from a 
combination of sources, including unstructured interviews conducted with government officials, 
company representatives, and NGOs during 2003.  Individuals interviewed are listed in the 
appendix. The fourth section summarizes some key findings from the research literature on 
auctions, with an emphasis on empirical studies that developed econometric methods for 
detecting collusion.  The fifth section presents an application of such methods to recent timber 
auction data from two Romanian forest directorates, Neamt and Suceava.  Our results confirms 
that data from Romanian timber auctions can be used to determine the likelihood of collusion, 
and it suggests that collusion reduced winning bids in Suceava in 2002 and perhaps also in 
Neamt, where less data were available.  The sixth section concludes this paper. 
                                                 
2 We review these studies in section 4. 
3 For example, tracts that sell for low prices might have few bidders not because of collusion but rather because they 
are of low quality.  To control for this endogeneity between the quality of a tract and the number of bidders, Vincent 
(1996) used the predicted number of bidders rather than the actual number in a re-analysis of the data.  He found less 
evidence of an impact of bidder number on winning prices.   5        
1.    Development of the timber auction system in Romania 
During the Communist era, each county in Romania had a single timber seller, which was the 
local NFA branch, and a single timber buyer, a state-owned forestry enterprise. The former sold 
timber to the latter at prices set by the government. This situation remained relatively unchanged 
for the first two years after Ceausescu was deposed. Then, in response to the emergence of 
private enterprises in the forest sector and financial pressure, the NFA branch in Neamt decided 
to experiment with auctions as a means of allocating standing timber to this new user group.  The 
NFA headquarters subsequently approved the use of auctions and encouraged other branches to 
use them.  Soon after, the government issued Ministerial Order 572 (1991), which mandated 
auctions for selling timber to private enterprises.  It did not, however, provide guidelines to 
implement auctions.  Each NFA branch introduced auctions at its own pace with its own rules. 
Government Decision 342 (1995) represented an initial attempt to create a consistent and 
comprehensive legal basis for the auction system.  Among other things, it extended the auction 
requirement to include timber sales to state-owned enterprises.  The Government had observed 
that winning bids in auctions organized for private firms exceeded by a large margin the 
administered prices paid by state-owned enterprises.  Government Decision 695 (1998) brought 
additional clarity and uniformity to the auction system.  It mandated auctions in all public 
forests, including the ones under the jurisdiction of local councils and not the NFA.  It 
authorized, but did not require, the NFA to administer auctions in non-NFA forests, including 
private forests.
4 
In addition to Government Decision 659, the current legal framework for timber auctions 
includes Governmental Regulation 96 (1998) concerning the management and administration of 
forests, together with the Forest Code.  It also includes several detailed governmental and 
ministerial regulations covering auction procedures, logging technologies and techniques, 
monitoring and enforcement of logging operations (tree marking, legal documents for harvested 
                                                 
4 In early 2004, Government Regulation 85 (2004) introduced new rules that require timber from forests controlled 
by local councils to be included in the NFA auctions.  It also included provisions to improve the advertising of 
upcoming auctions and the accounting of logging companies’ harvest quotas.  See sections 2.5 and 2.6. 
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timber, control of timber flows during harvesting), and harvest contracts (payments for timber 
harvested, payment and reimbursement of bid guarantees, resolution of disputes).
5 
Relatively few modifications have been made to the framework laws and regulations in 
the last five years, with the exception of regulations dealing with harvest contracts, which have 
changed at least once a year.  Ministerial Order 635 (2002) contains the main body of current 
contract regulations.  One important modification is NFA Order 6465 (October, 2001), which 
mandated sealed bidding instead of oral auctions and prohibited sales of timber by negotiation.  
The former mandate was quickly cancelled, but the latter prohibition remains in place. Another 
important modification is Law No. 654 (2002), which authorizes long-term timber sales. We 
discuss the motivation for this new law, and early experience with it, in Section 3. 
2.    Steps in the timber auction process 
In this section we describe the main steps in the timber auction process, in the approximate order 
in which they occur. 
2.1.   Annual allowable cut 
The process of selling timber starts with the determination of the annual allowable cut (AAC), 
which is the maximum volume of timber that may be harvested in a given year.  The building 
blocks for the AAC are forest production units.  These are relatively homogeneous areas of 
forestland that are intended to produce a sustained and even flow of timber over time.  Each 
production unit is intended to eventually contain equal areas of each forest age class (a “normal 
forest”).  Every ten years, the National Institute for Forestry Research and Management Planning 
(generally known by its Romanian acronym, ICAS), an autonomous unit within the NFA, 
prepares management plans for the production units.
6  These plans are reviewed by the Forest 
                                                 
5 Governmental Regulation 96 (1998) was recently modified by Law No. 120 (2004), which mainly concerns private 
forest administration and the enforcement of existing rules and regulations. 
6 A few dozen private firms have begun preparing management plans in the past few years.   Most operate in 
cooperation with ICAS instead of competing with it.   7        
and Wildlife Territorial Inspectorates in the National Authority for Control.
7  They contain 
proposed annual harvest schedules for the production units over the ten-year period.  These 
harvest schedules are intended to ensure that harvests are in balance with timber growth.  During 
the last two decades, ICAS has proposed an aggregate annual harvest below the estimated 
aggregate annual growth, to offset harvests that exceeded scheduled amounts in earlier periods. 
Each year, a top-down process is used to allocate the aggregate scheduled harvest across 
regions of the country, categories of forest owners (the state, local councils, private parties, etc.), 
and categories of forest users.  This process establishes the actual AAC.  There are three main 
categories of users: “economic agents” (i.e., timber harvesting and wood processing firms), the 
rural population, and the NFA itself.  Two subcategories have been added to the economic agents 
category since 2001: users who harvest for the needs of the National Construction Agency, and 
users who have won long-term contracts.  Before auctions, the NFA and holders of long-term 
contracts select tracts to fill their user shares.  The remaining tracts enter the auctions. 
The allocation of the AAC across regions and owner and user categories is significantly a 
political act.  It is proposed by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forests, Water, and Environment
8 
and must be approved by a parliamentary committee and signed by the Prime Minister.   
Although different user groups understandably lobby to influence the allocation in their favor, 
we found little evidence to suggest that corruption affects the allocation process. 
2.2.   Harvest scheduling and auction timing 
At the level of forest production units, the AAC is implemented through the harvest schedule, 
which indicates which tracts should be harvested in each year during the current decade.  Tract 
selection is driven largely by consideration of factors that affect long-run forest health, in 
particular forest regeneration and forest protection.  Natural catastrophes, such as windstorms, 
forest diseases, and pest outbreaks, affect the actual implementation of the harvest schedule.  The 
removal of damaged timber is given higher priority than the harvesting of tracts on the original 
                                                 
7 Before June 2003, the Inspectorates were in the Ministry of Agriculture, Forests, Waters, and Environment.  They 
also review forest management plans prepared by private firms. 
8 Since March 2004, the ministry has been reconfigured as the Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Rural 
Development.   8        
schedule, and when such salvage logging occurs, the harvest date for some of the tracts on the 
original schedule is postponed to ensure that the AAC is not exceeded. 
Forest directorates organize two primary auctions each year.  The first is in the spring, 
traditionally between March 1
st and April 15
th, when 40 percent of the AAC for the current year 
is sold.  The second is in the autumn, traditionally between August 1
st and September 15
th, when 
20 percent of the AAC for the current year and 40 percent of the AAC for the following year is 
sold.  Forest directorates can also organize secondary auctions for tracts that do not sell at the 
primary auctions or for emergency cuttings. The managers of administrative subunits of the 
forest directorates, which are termed forest divisions (ocolul silvic),
9 have a lot of latitude in 
allocating tracts between the spring and fall auctions.    NFA managers and staff at the forest 
division level also decide the quantity of timber offered at secondary auctions as well as the 
timing of those auctions. 
2.3.   Tree marking and timber inventory 
The selection of trees to be harvested within a tract depends on the silvicultural treatment applied 
(e.g., final harvest or thinning).  Trees to be harvested are marked individually with a special 
forest hammer.  An exception is made for clear cuts: in that case, the tract boundaries are simply 
marked in the field.  Trees are inventoried one by one, with information collected on species, 
trunk diameter 1.3 meters above the ground, and timber quality.  Each tree is given a serial 
number, which is painted on the trunk.  Tree heights are measured for a sample of marked trees. 
  Information from the inventory is recorded on the tract evaluation form (act de punere in 
valoare, or APV).  The NFA guarantees the timber volume reported on the APV to be accurate 
within 5 percent.
10  The APV constitutes the basis for timber transactions, because it identifies 
the quantity and the quality of timber to be sold.  The APV also plays an essential role in law 
enforcement, because it provides proof that timber can be legally harvested.  Each APV is given 
a unique identifying number. 
                                                 
9 The boundaries of forest divisions do not necessary coincide with the boundaries of forest production units.   
10 Winning bidders have a limited time in which to dispute the NFA’s volume estimates and must incur what can be 
considerable forest inventory costs in order to make their case.   9        
2.4.  Reserve  prices 
The government’s reserve price, specified on the APV, is one of the few pieces of economic 
information provided on the APV.  It provides the starting point for bidding and is expressed in 
lei per cubic meter, averaged across the total timber volume in a tract.  When the government 
issued the first comprehensive regulations for timber auctions in 1995, it declared that reserve 
prices must be approved by the Ministry of Finance.  In 1997 it removed reserve prices from the 
list of state-approved prices and authorized the NFA to set reserve prices independently, guided 
by two principles: covering the costs of forest administration, and setting a higher price for better 
quality and more accessible timber.  In April 2001, however, the government brought reserve 
prices back under state supervision; currently, the NFA must submit proposed reserve prices to 
the Competition Office for review.  The reserve prices approved by the Competition Office must 
be used in all auctions for public timber, though not in auctions for timber in private forests. 
  Reserve prices are one of the most important tools that governments have to fight 
collusion and ensure that the timber sold in auctions fetches a fair market price.  Unfortunately, 
the most thorough previous study on timber auctions in Romania, which analyzed 1992-95 data 
from auctions in Suceava, concluded that “current starting [i.e., reserve] prices are far below 
market values and inadequately reflect variations in market values, thus raising the risk that the 
government is not receiving as much revenue as it could and reducing the ability of stumpage 
prices to stimulate more efficient wood-based industries” (HIID 1996, p. 3).  This is a result of 
basing reserve prices on forest administration costs instead of on data related to the market value 
of timber.  We return to this point in the concluding section. 
2.5.  Marketing 
Forest directorates are required to publish announcements of auctions at least 30 days before the 
auction date in two newspapers, one of which must be local. Most directorates also publicize 
auctions on the Internet.  Several forest directorates—in particular, Arad, Ialomita, Mures, and 
Timis—have aggressively implemented measures to attract more firms to participate in their 
auctions.  Examples include publicizing auctions a year in advance, promoting lesser-known 
timber varieties, and meeting with representatives of harvesting firms to better understand their 
needs.  The Tomnatec forest division in Suceava, which until recently was managed by ICAS,   10        
has been a pioneer in using direct marketing methods to publicize its auctions.
 11  I t  f a x e s  
invitations to firms and follows up with phone calls. 
Interested firms are allowed to review the APV for each tract before an auction.  They are 
also allowed to review a separate document that describes all the rules for harvesting the tract as 
well as the deadline for signing the timber harvest contract by the winning bidder. 
2.6.   Qualification and registration of bidders and bid guarantee 
Five days before an auction, the forest directorate decides which firms are qualified to 
participate.  There are four main qualification criteria: the firm must be legally constituted; it 
must have timber harvesting as an economic activity; it must not have outstanding debts to the 
forest directorate organizing the auction or to other forest directorates; and it must not have 
exceeded its authorized timber harvest quota for the current year.   
The fourth criterion requires additional explanation.  In 1995, as part of Government 
Decision 695, the Government created a committee to determine the annual harvesting capacity 
of individual companies in the forest sector.  The committee has 9 members: 4 with expertise in 
forest management, 4 with expertise in timber harvesting, and 1 with expertise in wood 
processing.  It reviews a company’s technical capabilities, financial status, and human resources 
and, on this basis, determines the total annual amount of timber that the company is authorized to 
harvest.  The NFA allows a company to participate in an auction only if the amount of timber the 
company already has under contract is less than the company’s annual quota.  The NFA is 
reportedly diligent in enforcing this rule. 
Firms that qualify to participate in an auction must register in advance for the individual 
tracts they intend to bid on.  For each such tract, they must pay the NFA a deposit, or bid 
guarantee, which is equal to 5 or 10% of the estimated minimum value of a tract (= reserve price 
times timber volume), depending on the size of the tract.  The deposit is intended to discourage 
frivolous bidding.  The NFA returns the deposits to losing bidders within 3 days of the auction. 
                                                 
11 It was transferred to NFA administration due to alleged mismanagement.   11        
2.7.  Bidding  procedure 
The NFA has experimented with both oral and sealed auctions.  Until 2001, it used mainly oral 
auctions.  As noted earlier, in October of that year it prohibited oral auctions.  Although this 
prohibition was quickly cancelled, since January-February 2002 some forest directorates have 
organized only sealed-bid auctions.
12 
A sale is considered final only when there are at least two registered bidders and at least 
one of them offers the reserve price.  Tracts that fail to sell at the primary auction are then 
proposed for sale at a secondary auction, which is typically scheduled within a few weeks of the 
original auction.  Until recently, the forest directorate was allowed to sell any tracts still unsold 
after the second auction by negotiating with the last firms that expressed interest in them.  A 
verbal order of the NFA chief executive, issued in early 2003, prohibited such negotiated sales. 
2.8.   Timber harvest contract and harvest warranty 
The high bidder must sign a timber harvest contract within 10 working days after the auction or 
lose its bid guarantee.  After signing, it must pay the NFA a deposit of 5 percent of the auction 
value (= winning bid times timber volume) before it begins harvesting.  This harvest warranty is 
intended to discourage logging damage.  The NFA returns the warranty at the end of the 
harvesting operation if the remaining stand is not damaged. 
2.9.   Differences across forest directorates 
Some of the procedures described above can differ across forest directorates.  They include: 
•  The rules for accepting the APV.  In Neamt, firms cannot claim any adjustment for 
discrepancies between estimated and actual timber volumes once harvesting has begun.  
In Suceava, firms can request a re-evaluation of timber volumes (and qualities) up until 
the halfway point of the period scheduled for harvesting the tract. 
•  The wording of harvest contracts, in particular rules related to breach of contract and 
litigation. 
•  The possibility of negotiating deadlines related to the harvest contract. 
•  The scheduling of payments. 
                                                 
12 There is just a single round of bidding in the sealed-bid auctions.   12        
3.  Effects of economic and institutional factors on bids in Romanian 
timber auctions 
Bids in timber auctions are affected by both the physical characteristics of tracts, such as the 
amounts and qualities of timber they contain or their terrain, broader economic and institutional 
factors.  The effects of physical characteristics are straightforward: for example, tracts with more 
timber of higher quality tend to attract higher bids, while tracts with more difficult terrain tend to 
attract lower bids.  Differences in physical characteristics have been found to be important in 
explaining bid variations across tracts in Romania (HIID 1996, Vincent 1996). 
In this section, we focus instead on the effects of various economic and institutional 
factors, especially the ones that affect the degree of competition in timber auctions.  These 
factors can affect multiple auctions or multiple tracts within the same auction; they are more 
“macro” than the “micro” characteristics of individual tracts.  We begin with basic supply and 
demand considerations and close with factors related to corruption and collusion.  Our main 
purpose is to understand the impact of these factors on the winning bids in timber auctions, in 
order to provide a basis for formulating our econometric models and interpreting our results. 
3.1.   Regional timber markets within Romania 
Geographical differences in forest composition, terrain, infrastructure, and other factors have led 
to the development of several fairly distinct timber markets in Romania.  These markets are by 
no means autarkic—for example, officials in the Timis forest directorate tell of a wood 
processing company from a town 400 km east that regularly purchases timber in the directorate’s 
auctions—but the differences are sufficiently great to produce persistent differences in the level 
of winning bids.  The very fact that winning bids vary across the regions suggests that timber 
markets are functioning in the basic sense of reflecting differences in supply and demand forces. 
Table 1 shows data on scheduled sales of mature timber at auctions held during the first 7 
months of 2003 in each forest directorate.  Volumes are totals for the 7-month period, and 
winning bids are weighted-average means (i.e., total sales values divided by total volumes sold).  
“Mixed hardwoods” and “mixed softwoods” both refer to miscellaneous species in the broad-
leaved tree group.  Mean winning bids that are below the national mean for a particular timber 
group and directorate are shown in italics.  The data in this table indicate that the directorates   13        
vary greatly in terms of the amounts and types of timber sold by auction and the mean winning 
bids for that timber.  Suceava stands out as a directorate that sells a large volume of mature 
timber, overwhelmingly coniferous, followed by Neamt.  Bacau and Caras Severin are major 
sellers of nonconiferous timber. Winning bids tend to be highest in directorates in the East, 
Northwest/West, and South regions, and lowest in the Central, Danube, and Southwest regions. 
Based on this table and other sources of information, we can describe the regional timber 
markets in the country as follows. The most timber-rich regions are the Northeast, 
Northwest/West, East, and Southwest.  The Northeast is the largest supply source for coniferous 
species such as pine, fir, and spruce.  It has a well-established industry with large capacity in 
both timber harvesting and wood processing. 
Nonconiferous species are more important in the Northwest/West and East (oak and 
cherry) and Southwest (beech).  Among these three regions, demand tends to be greater in the 
Northwest/West, due to high export demand from neighboring western countries.  As a 
consequence, winning bids have tended to be higher than in the East.
13  Demand in the 
Southwest, which includes only the Caras Severin forest directorate, is very weak despite the 
good quality of the region’s beech stands. This region is lightly populated and has high wage 
rates, due to a large mining industry and commercial trading opportunities with neighboring 
Serbia. The tight labor market has discouraged the development of local timber harvesting and 
wood processing industries. 
The Central region and the South have strong demand but poor supply.  Factories in these 
regions rely on timber harvested elsewhere.  The Central region has the biggest investment in 
wood processing in Romania, but it also has the smallest area of public forest in the country, and 
forest ownership is divided among numerous small owners due to restitution.  This depresses 
demand for timber from local sources because mills prefer to deal with large, stable suppliers. 
The Danube region (counties of Bucuresti, Constanta, Dolj, Ialomita, Mehedinti, Olt, 
Tulcea) is a special case.  It has a substantial supply of poplar trees.  There is some export 
demand for poplar wood, but it is not consistent.  There is also some domestic demand by the 
                                                 
13 This was not the case during the first 7 months of 2003, however: winning bids were fairly consistently higher in 
the East than in the Northwest/West.   14        
pulp and paper industry.  However, Law No. 570 (2003), adopted in late 2003, prohibits timber 
harvests for 3 years in much of this region and parts of the South.  The stated reason is to fight 
desertification. 
3.2. Factors on the supply side 
3.2.1.  Number of timber sellers 
The NFA manages timber supply from state forests in Romania.  These forests currently account 
for about three-quarters of the country’s forest area, but this proportion is declining due to 
restitution.  Nevertheless, the NFA remains the leader in the wood market in Romania.  It sells 
about four-fifths of the total volume of timber harvested in the country, and its supply decisions 
have a strong influence on timber prices.  Its ability to supply large timber volumes on a regular 
basis makes it the preferred timber source for large firms. 
Local councils administer just above 10 percent of the total forest area, approximately 
750,000 hectares.  Of this amount, about 400,000 hectares are managed by the NFA on a contract 
basis.  Local councils sell standing timber by auction, using the same reserve prices as the NFA.  
Timber from local council forests managed by the NFA is sold in the same auctions as timber 
from the NFA’s own forests (i.e., state forests).  The amount of timber offered by local councils 
is reportedly large enough in some locations to depress the winning bids in NFA auctions by a 
significant amount.  Local councils tend to put strong pressure on the Ministry to authorize a 
larger AAC.  They have chronically low budgets, and their primary forest management objective 
is revenue generation. 
Individual private owners administer approximately another 10 percent of the total forest 
area.  They have differing management objectives.  Most, like the local councils, have a strong 
interest in short-term income.  Others, however, would like to preserve the forest for a future 
time when they expect to need wood for building houses, etc.  Private owners are not required to 
sell timber by auction, nor are they required to use the official reserve prices if they do (unless 
the NFA administers the auctions on their behalf).  At present, any influence they have on timber 
markets tends to be very local and ephemeral. 
Owner associations administer forests in the eastern Carpathian Mountains.  These 
associations trace back to common property forests that the Austrian Empire granted to local   15        
communities in return for guarding its borders.  Like private owners, the associations are not 
required to sell timber by auction.  They have a strong revenue motive and can consistently 
influence prices in local markets. 
Churches (including monasteries) comprise the final category of timber sellers.  Their 
properties are individually small, 30 hectares each, and are spread all over the country.  The total 
area of their properties can be sizeable in counties with many churches, though still much less 
than before the communist rule.  For example, an estimated 15,000 hectares will be restored to 
churches in Suceava (14,000 hectares have already been restored), compared to the nearly 
200,000 hectares owned by them previously.  The churches’ main forest management objective 
is to produce raw material for new buildings or restoration of existing ones.  They tend to use 
most of the timber they harvest.  Their influence on the market is not significant in most forest 
directorates except at a very local level. 
3.2.2.  Annual allowable cut 
The NFA and local councils are inelastic supply sources, owing to the determination of timber 
harvests on the basis of AAC calculations instead of timber market conditions.  The effect, well 
known to forest economists, is to exacerbate the volatility of timber prices over the course of the 
business cycle (Waggener 1969).  When markets are strong, mills are starved for timber and bid 
up prices to levels that can lead to widespread bankruptcies if markets cool off too rapidly.
14  
Conversely, when market conditions are weak, as they have been in Romania during much of the 
post-communist period, the result is low bids: supply is too high relative to demand.  Some tracts 
might go unsold simply because they are put on the market at the wrong time, not because they 
are inherently undesirable. 
To a certain extent, timber prices have been inadvertently supported by the policy of 
setting scheduled harvests below growth and, since the early 2000s, by the failure of the Ministry 
to set annual harvest quotas on time.
15  Some auctions have been postponed or cancelled due to 
the latter factor.  Large salvage sales have partially offset this factor in some directorates (e.g., 
Neamt in 2002).  Moreover, it is not clear that the policy to reduce scheduled harvests has been 
                                                 
14 As happened in the U.S. in the early 1980s.  See Mattey (1990). 
15 The Ministry did set the quota for 2005 on time.   16        
followed in practice: the share of forestland in the 0-20 year age class, approximately 22 percent, 
remains significantly larger than the share for any of the other five 20-year age classes (20-40, 
40-60, 60-80, 80-100, 100+), even though communist rule ended 14 years ago. 
  Planning by forest users—determining where the AAC is likely to bind and where it is 
likely to make surplus timber available, and making wood-processing investments accordingly—
is difficult because ICAS’s forest management plans are not publicly available.  Potential bidders 
do not learn about a tract’s availability until an auction is advertised.  This lack of information 
can also be expected to contribute to increased price volatility, because milling capacity is less 
likely to be in line with the supplies actually made available. 
3.2.3.  Physical access to timber 
A limited and poorly maintained road network increases the costs of forest access and thus 
depresses bids in timber auctions.  According to a report prepared for the World Bank by 
Environmental Resources Management,
16 Romania’s road network includes 32,500 km of forest 
roads, 7,600 km of public roads in or near forests that can be used for logging operations, and 
1,450 km of roads that were constructed for other purposes, such as mining, but can be used for 
logging.
17  This network provides access to only 65 percent of Romania's production forests.  Its 
density, at 6.1 m/ha, is much less than in other European countries with mountainous forests.  
For example, Austria, France, Germany, and Switzerland all have 25-45 m/ha of roads in regions 
with timber producing forests. 
Most of the forest roads in Romania were constructed before 1985.  They became the 
responsibility of the NFA in 1994.  Although the NFA has constructed more than 300 km of 
forest roads and rehabilitated nearly 300 km, some 7,000 km have become unusable due to 
deterioration and inadequate maintenance.  Effective access is thus even less than the figures in 
the previous paragraph would indicate. 
                                                 
16 Environmental Assessment Update, Volume I: Summary and Main Report (September 2002), prepared for the 
Romania Forest Development Project. 
17 There are also 65 km of forest railroads.   17        
3.3. Factors on the demand side 
3.3.1.  Number of timber buyers 
Only domestic firms are permitted to participate in the NFA’s auctions for standing timber.  
Winning firms are not allowed to resell tracts to other firms, domestic or foreign.  The NFA 
formerly organized a separate set of auctions for harvested logs—not standing timber—that were 
open to foreign firms, but it suspended them following strong lobbying by domestic wood 
processors.  Foreign demand thus influences Romanian stumpage prices only indirectly, through 
derived demand resulting from exports of sawn wood and other processed products.  Though 
indirect, this influence is significant.  Economic conditions in the Middle East, which is the 
traditional import leader for Romanian sawn wood, are particularly influential.  The stumpage 
price for beech fell after Middle Eastern demand for steamed beech sawn wood fell.  Economic 
conditions in Western Europe are becoming more influential.  Exports to the west have increased 
recently due to Western European investments in the wood processing industry. 
Domestic timber buyers fall into two categories.  The first includes free-standing logging 
companies that purchase standing timber and sell the harvested logs to wood processing 
companies.  According to a report by WWF,
18 the original single, state-owned logging company 
split into three regional companies in 1993.  By 1994, these had split into 17 companies with 
majority state ownership.  By 1996, they had split again into 32 companies.  The state remained 
the major shareholder, but the proportion of private shareholders increased. This trend of rising 
private ownership has continued.  In addition to the splitting and privatization of former state-
owned companies, around 1,000 small private logging companies emerged during the 1990s.  
Many have since gone bankrupt and ceased operating.  Around 600-700 remained as of 1999.  
The second category includes companies that process wood.  According to the National 
Institute of Statistics, in 2002 there were 8,634 commercial enterprises in the wood-processing 
sector (including furniture and pulp & paper), of which 271 were classified as large (more than 
250 employees).  Most of the large firms have mixed state/private ownership.  Of the remaining 
enterprises, 1,589 were classified as medium (100-250 employees) and 6,774 as small (less than 
                                                 
18 Technical report on the implementation of the “Certified Forest Products Trade Analysis and Facilitation” Project 
in the countries of Slovakia and Romania, prepared by the WWF-Danube Carpathian Programme for the Global 
Forest and Trade Initiative (undated, but evidently mid-2000).   18        
100 employees).
19  Most of the small and medium firms are privately owned.
20  The small 
enterprises are mainly primary processors—sawmills, veneer mills, plywood mills—while most 
of the medium and large ones go further downstream and make furniture, parquet, etc.   
Some of the wood-processing firms are vertically integrated upstream and have their own 
logging crews.  According to the same source,
21 in 2002 there were 2,246 companies engaged in 
timber harvesting in the country, including 43 territorial units of the NFA.  Of these, 1,939 were 
limited liability companies, which correspond to small and medium firms, while 81 were joint 
stock companies, which correspond to large firms.  Sixty-one percent of the 1,692 companies 
that completed the government’s annual questionnaire stated that they processed wood in 
addition to harvesting it.  Sawmills are especially likely to have their own logging crews, and 
large sawmills are especially aggressive in seeking cheap raw material.  They use their ability to 
buy large amounts on a regular basis to convince individual private owners and forest 
associations to sell standing timber to them outside the auction system and at attractive prices. 
There is thus a large pool of timber buyers in the country, albeit one that is relatively 
shallow in terms of larger companies.  In the absence of local monopsonies or collusion (see 
section 3.4.2 below), this large pool should lead to highly competitive auctions.  One potential 
entry barrier is the central commission that authorizes firms’ harvesting capacities, but this 
barrier is porous.  The commission’s evaluation is based on documents provided by firms.  The 
commission does not check the actual equipment and other resources that firms claim to own or 
have access to for harvesting.  This creates an incentive for firms to exaggerate their harvesting 
capacity in order to receive a larger authorization and thus qualify to buy more timber.   
                                                 
19 There were no small- or medium-scale wood-processing companies (including pulp and paper and furniture) 
before 1990, when the existing 244 large companies in the country were split to improve their management and to 
make them more attractive for privatization. 
20 Some churches also operate mills as a money-making venture (not just to produce lumber for their own use).  
21 “Ancheta statistica privind volumul exploatat de catre agentii economici atestati si suprafata parcursa cu taieri in 
anul 2002.” Bucuresti, 22 p. 
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3.3.2.  Technology 
Technologies continue to be outdated and production processes inefficient for many firms in the 
Romanian forest sector.  This is especially true for timber harvesting companies.  Inefficient 
technologies reduce the amount firms can pay for a cubic meter of standing timber. 
The small size of the tracts auctioned by the NFA has been identified as one obstacle to 
more rapid technological change in the sector.  A single tract is sufficient to supply a company 
for only a short period.  Even if a company succeeds in purchasing many tracts at one auction, it 
must harvest them all within a half-year or so.  The resulting lack of resource security reportedly 
diminishes the incentive to invest in improved harvesting and processing equipment. 
In response to this situation, in 2002 the Government issued Law No. 71 (operational in 
2003): it authorizes auctions for 10-year timber supplies, but only firms with wood-processing 
facilities are allowed to participate.  Initial experience has been disappointing as none of the 
large foreign investors in the Romanian wood-processing sector (e.g., Ambro, Fratti or 
Schweighoffer) has participated so far.
 22  They had evidently no interested in forming long-term 
partnerships with Romanian firms in order to qualify to bid on the sales.  This is discouraging 
because foreign investors have been primarily responsible for the limited technological change 
that occurred in the sector, such as the capability to process small diameter logs. 
3.4. Corruption and collusion 
3.4.1.  Corruption 
Quantitative measures of the amount of corruption in Romanian timber markets do not exist.  
Allegations of corruption come mainly from logging companies.  They fall into two categories, 
bribery and fraud.  Companies claim that NFA officers have sometimes demanded bribes in 
return for approving one or more of the numerous requirements that firms must satisfy to 
                                                 
22 One million cubic meters were offered for sale in 2002.  Although 60 companies registered, they bought only 
200,000 cubic meters.  A smaller amount of timber, 800,000 cubic meters, was offered in 2003.  Although nearly all 
of it sold, there were fewer bidders than in 2002, and they did not bid vigorously.  Most of the contracts sold for just 
two bidding steps above the reserve price.  Demand remained weak in 2004, when 400,000 cubic meters was 
offered.  This Information is drawn from editorials posted on the website, forestry.ro. 
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participate in auctions or to harvest the timber they have purchased.
23  These claims appear to be 
more common in regions where firms are small and have few alternative sources of timber.  
When we asked a representative of one firm what would happen if he refused to pay bribes, he 
answered that he would never refuse, because forest officers wield too much discretionary 
power: they determine which roads to repair, thus affecting the firm’s access its tracts; which 
tracts to guard, thus protecting the firm’s timber and logging equipment from theft; and what 
penalties to assess in case of timber harvesting delays or logging damage, thus determining the 
amount of the harvest warranty returned to the firm.  
The second alleged form of corruption involves NFA officers selling timber outside the 
auction system. One story we were told is that an NFA forester might mark some trees only at 
the base of the trunk and then cover the marks with leaves and branches, thus causing the trees 
not to be recorded on the APV as part of the sale.  The forester can then sell this unrecorded 
timber to the firm that wins the tract and pocket the payment himself. 
To the extent they exist, these two forms of corruption can be expected to have opposite 
impacts on firms’ bidding behavior.  If firms expect that they will need to pay bribes in order to 
obtain necessary approvals, then they will place lower bids.  On the other hand, if firms expect 
that they will be able to harvest more timber than the APV indicates is present in a tract, then 
they may place bids that appear unusually high.  Information on corruption in the sector is too 
anecdotal to speculate on which impact is likely to dominate. 
3.4.2.  Collusion 
Romania’s history of having one large state-owned harvesting enterprise in each forest 
directorate, combined with the slow emergence of large privately-owned new enterprises, has 
resulted in the domination of timber markets by one or a few large firms in most forest 
directorates.  A substantial portion of the national harvest is made by just three companies, 
Forestar, Euroforest, and Romanel.  In some directorates, dominant firms reportedly avoid 
competing with each other by dividing the directorate into regions of influence where they act as 
local monopsonies.  This can be expected to result in excessively low winning bids. 
                                                 
23 Bribes are reportedly often paid in kind (a truckload of logs) instead of in cash.   21        
The opposite, excessively high bids, can occur if dominant firms engage in preclusive 
bidding to defend their turf.  This reportedly has also occurred.  Because large companies buy 
many tracts, their average purchase price is not significantly affected if they overbid on a few 
tracts in order to prevent other companies from winning.
24  An extreme example occurred in 
1999, when one large company essentially prevented an auction from occurring.  Few other firms 
even dared to enter the auction hall.  The company intimidated those who did by placing opening 
bids two to three times greater than the reserve price. 
If collusion is occurring in Romanian timber auctions, then the former effect— 
excessively low winning bids—should be more common than the latter.  Dominant firms can be 
expected to use preclusive bidding sparingly, to avoid dissipating the benefits of collusion.  If the 
costs of excluding competitors or enforcing a cartel are too high, then it does not pay to collude.  
For these reasons, our econometric analysis of collusion in Romanian timber auctions focuses on 
detecting excessively low winning bids.  In view of the points discussed in sections 3.1-3.3, this 
analysis obviously must control for other factors that influence the level of winning bids.  Before 
providing more detail on our analysis, we consider methods that other researchers have applied 
to detect collusion.  Our analysis uses similar methods. 
4.    Previous research on collusion 
Interest in methods for detecting collusion has increased during the past twenty years, in tandem 
with a rising interest in using auctions to allocate a broad range of resources from the public to 
the private sector. Several recent papers in the research literature have employed econometric 
approaches to detect collusion.  In this section, we summarize some of the main findings from 
this literature.   
At the outset, it is important to emphasize that there is no universal strategy for detecting 
collusion using auction data (Hendricks and Porter 1989).  Instead, institutions, market 
characteristics, and bidder heterogeneity need to be taken into account in tailored ways in 
empirical studies.  Most of the empirical studies have relied only loosely on auction theory in 
                                                 
24 Some small companies say they are “slaves” of larger companies, unable to compete within them in the auctions 
and dependent on their trading chains.  On the other hand, some large companies complain about unfair competition 
from small companies, which they claim evade taxes and thus can afford to bid more for timber.     22        
determining how to deal with these complexities.  In part this is because the theory of collusion 
in auction markets is surprisingly recent.
25  Even today, most of the theory pertains to simple, 
one-time auctions in which just a single item is offered for sale.  A well-developed theory of 
collusion in repeated auctions in which multiple items are offered for sale—that is, a theory that 
matches two of the basic characteristics of timber auctions—does not yet exist. 
4.1.   Early studies on collusion in timber auctions 
Timber auctions have been a recurrent focus of empirical auction research.  Anecdotal evidence 
of collusion in auctions for timber in U.S. national forests has repeatedly been documented (e.g., 
see U.S. House of Representatives 1977), although few cases have been successfully prosecuted.  
Early studies focused on differences between bids in oral and sealed-bid auctions as a means of 
inferring the presence of collusion. 
The first study was by Mead (1967).  He began by considering how basic industry 
characteristics affect the merits of oral versus sealed-bid auctions, leaving aside the risk of 
collusion.  He argued that oral bidding is more appropriate when several of the following 
conditions hold: fixed investment is high, transportation costs are important, sources of raw 
materials are few, specific qualities are needed, sales are frequent, and financing is limited.  He 
claimed that these considerations explain why oral auctions are used more frequently for timber, 
whereas sealed-bid auctions are typically preferred for oil and gas.  Mead then went on to argue 
that oral auctions are more susceptible to collusion because they facilitate preclusive bidding.   
Many years later, Robinson (1985) provided theoretical support for this claim in the context of a 
single-object auction: assuming that cartel members share the same information, he proved that 
cartels are stable for oral ascending-bid auctions but not for sealed-bid auctions, in both common 
value and independent private value auction models.
26  In the empirical portion of his paper, 
Mead presented evidence indicating that oral bids had indeed generated lower prices in Forest 
                                                 
25 For example, Milgrom and Weber (1982, p. 1090) stated that “Situations in which bidders collude have received 
no attention in theoretical [auction] studies.”   
26 In a common value model, the object for sale is assumed to have the same value for all bidders, but bidders do not 
know this value in advance.  They differ in terms of their estimates of the object’s value.  In an independent private 
values model, the value of the object differs across bidders, and bidders know their own (but not competitors’) 
values.   23        
Service timber sales than sealed bids (the Forest Service uses both bidding procedures), and he 
concluded that collusion was the reason. 
Johnson (1979) contested this conclusion, offering an alternative explanation related to 
differences between firms.  He noted that theoretical results in Vickrey (1961) indicated that oral 
and sealed bidding should yield similar prices on average when firms are homogeneous and 
bidding is competitive (no collusion).  When firms are heterogeneous, however—for example, 
when some bidders have a known comparative cost advantage over others—Johnson found that 
oral bidding can yield lower prices even when bidding is competitive.  Further muddying the 
water, a subsequent theoretical study by Milgrom and Weber (1982) demonstrated that the 
opposite result—winning prices in oral auctions exceeding those in sealed-bid auctions—can 
occur in competitive auctions when bidders are symmetric and risk neutral and have “affiliated” 
values for the object being auctioned.
27  The upshot is that a simple comparison of winning 
prices in oral and sealed-bid auctions does not provide a reliable means of detecting collusion. 
4.2.   Testing for collusion using econometric methods 
More recent empirical studies on collusion have used increasingly refined statistical techniques.  
They have examined auctions for not only timber (e.g., Brannman 1996 and Baldwin et al. 1997) 
but also various other goods and services, including offshore oil leases (Hendricks and Porter 
1988), construction contracts (Porter and Zona 1993, Bajari and Ye 2001), and school milk 
contracts (Porter and Zona 1999, Pesendorfer 2000).  Porter and Zona (1993) emphasized that a 
simple and universal procedure for detecting collusion does not exist and is unlikely to be 
developed.  In large part this is because collusion can take many different forms, including 
kickbacks (a cartel member pays others to win a specific auction), bid rotation schemes (cartel 
members alternate who wins), and phantom bidding (cartel members submit fake, losing-bids to 
create the appearance of competition).  In fact, if a universal test for detecting collusion were 
available, a knowledgeable cartel would have an incentive to devise a bidding strategy, based for 
example on phantom bids, such that the auction data would appear to have been generated by a 
competitive process. 
                                                 
27 "Roughly, [affiliation] means that a high value of one bidder’s estimate makes high values of the others’ estimates 
more likely” (Milgrom and Weber 1982, p. 1096).   24        
The inherent unobservability of key variables is also a problem.  The ultimate goal of 
collusion is to secure high profits, but data on bidders’ profits are typically difficult to obtain. 
State-of-the-art econometric procedures for detecting collusion therefore are linked instead to 
observable aspects of bidder behavior that are expected to differ in competitive and collusive 
contexts. These procedures attempt to go beyond the simple detection of patterns that are 
consistent with collusion, since such patterns could instead merely reflect unobservable 
characteristics of the bidders or the items being auctioned.  In most cases, the procedures involve 
estimating at least two models, with the structure of one being consistent with bidding being 
competitive while the structure of the other is consistent with bidding being collusive.  The two 
models are then compared in terms of how well they fit the data. 
We review here the procedures employed in three empirical studies: Porter and Zona 
(1993), which examined auctions for state highway construction contracts on Long Island, and 
Brannman (1996) and Baldwin et al. (1997), which like Mead (1967) and Johnson (1979) 
examined U.S. Forest Service timber sales.  All three concluded that collusion was occurring.  
Porter and Zona tested for collusion by analyzing differences in the ranking of competitive and 
cartel bids using an ordered logit model.  With one big exception, they had relatively little 
information about the firms.  The exception was that they knew the composition of the cartel at 
the start of the sample period.  They knew little about the jobs put out for bid aside from the 
winning bids.  Their explanatory variables included a dummy variable for whether a firm is 
headquartered on Long Island and a “Backlog” variable that gives the dollar value of contracts 
won and not yet completed by a firm.  Other variables are built from “Backlog,” such as “Cap,” 
defined as the maximum backlog over the periods considered, or “Util” (= “Backlog”/“Cap”), 
which accounts for how busy a firm is.  Porter and Zona found that the ranking of cartel bids did 
not coincide with the ranking of costs and thus rejected the null hypothesis of no phantom bids, 
an outcome which suggests the presence of collusion. 
Brannman (1996) focused on the effect of potential competition on winning bids.   
According to economic theory, potential entrants to an imperfectly competitive market should 
limit the ability of participating firms to collude.  Brannman proposed two measures of potential 
competition.  The first one, called simply potential competition, is a count of the number of firms 
whose closest mill lies within the boundaries of the market for Forest Service sales.  The second 
one, called expected competition, is the sum of the estimated participation probabilities of firms   25        
capable of taking part in an auction.  He estimated these probabilities using a probit analysis of 
the link between auction participation and hauling distance.   
Brannman included five categories of explanatory variables in his regression models: in 
addition to the competition variables, Forest Service appraisal components, sale characteristics, 
bidder characteristics, and product market information.  Appraisal components included total 
appraisal value, selling value, harvesting costs, and manufacturing costs, all per thousand board 
feet, in addition to the average hauling distance to rival mills and its standard deviation (both 
were excluded if the expected number of bidders was included).  Observed sale characteristics 
included tract acreage, percentage per-acre material, a dummy for salvage value, road 
construction costs, a county dummy, and whether the sale was a Small Business Administration  
set-aside sale.  Bidder characteristics had two components: hauling distance to the winner’s 
closest mill, and whether or not a firm is large.  Finally, product market information was 
summarized by average monthly lumber selling prices and contract duration.  One difference 
compared to Porter and Zona is that Brannman did not account for the contracts the firms already 
held. 
Brannman analyzed data from 1977 for both oral and sealed-bid Forest Service auctions.  
He found that both measures of potential competition were important in explaining winning bids, 
but not as important as actual competition (ie., the actual number of bidders).  He argued that this 
suggests the presence of collusion.  In addition, he found that longer hauling distances were 
associated with higher winning bids in the sealed-bid auctions.  Echoing Mead (1967), he offered 
preclusive bidding as a likely explanation. 
Unlike Brannman, Baldwin et al. (1997) focused exclusively on winning bids in oral 
auctions.  They also based their analysis more directly on the theory of bidder behavior, in an 
independent private values auction framework.
28  Brannman had argued that timber auctions fit 
neither the common value model nor the independent private values model.  The key feature of 
their study was that it used a model presented in Graham and Marshall (1987) to endogenize the 
effective size of a bidder cartel.  The authors had no direct information on whether a cartel 
existed among Forest Service timber buyers or, if it did, how many firms it contained.  They only 
                                                 
28 Vincent (1996) also used an independent private values framework in his analysis of bidding behavior in Suceava.   26        
knew the number of bidders who registered to bid, the highest and second-highest bids, and the 
identities of the firms who placed those bids.  Using assumptions about the distribution of the 
unobserved private values of the bidders, they developed a maximum likelihood procedure that 
predicted the size of the cartel that best explained the observed winning bids, controlling for such 
factors as the volume of timber in a tract, timber quality, logging costs, the terms of the harvest 
contract, local inventories of timber, and special events that took place during the study period 
(e.g., natural disasters).  They then compared the likelihood statistic from this collusive model to 
the likelihood statistic from a noncooperative model that included the same variables but no 
allowance for endogenous cartel formation.   
Baldwin et al. analyzed a relatively small sample of 114 Forest Service sales that took 
place between 1975 and 1981, out of a total of 3,355 sales.  They limited the sample so severely 
in order to ensure that the data were as consistent as possible with the assumptions of the 
independent private values framework.  They estimated five models: a non-cooperative (i.e., 
competitive) model that treated the sale of each timber tract as a single-unit auction event; a 
single-unit collusive model; a non-cooperative, multi-unit model that included supply effects 
resulting from multiple tracts being offered at the same auction (such supply effects could 
confound the detection of collusion); and two nesting models that combined collusion with the 
multi-unit model.  Their multi-unit model was based on Weber (1983) and Milgrom and Weber 
(1982), and it was an innovation in the empirical auction literature.  They concluded from their 
econometric results that winning bids were best explained by the models that allowed for 
collusive behavior.  
5.    Econometric analysis of collusion in Romanian timber auctions 
This section presents our econometric analysis of collusion in Romanian timber auctions.  Like 
the mid-1990s study on Romanian timber auctions described in HIID (1996) and Vincent (1996), 
we analyze data from Suceava, but we also analyzes data from Neamt.  The auctions in both 
cases are oral (ascending-bid) auctions.  Neamt was the first forest directorate in Romania to 
introduce timber auctions as a regular means of selling standing timber to both private and public 
enterprises, having done so shortly before Suceava.  Romanian forestry experts interviewed 
during June-July 2003 claimed that large enterprises commonly exert market power in Neamt.    27        
Such concerns were less strongly expressed about auctions in Suceava.  This difference makes 
for a potentially interesting comparison of the two regions. 
The biggest difference compared to the mid-1990s study is that we examine the issue of 
collusion directly.  The earlier study focused on determining whether reserve prices reflected 
differences in the value of tracts put up for bid.  In the case of Suceava, we apply the competitive 
and collusive single-unit models developed by Baldwin et al. (1997).  In the case of Neamt, we 
apply a cruder approach, due to a lack of data on the number of registered bidders for each tract. 
The need to apply a cruder approach in Neamt points to another difference compared to 
the earlier study: available data on tract characteristics were less detailed, even for Suceava.  Few 
data related to the auctions are computerized in either forest directorate.  The field team for the 
earlier study had more time and resources to extract relevant data from written records and enter 
them into electronic databases.  We were able to compile data on the volume of timber in a tract 
and the type of timber sale (mature, thinning, salvage) for both forest directorates, and several 
additional tract characteristics for Suceava. This amount of data on tract characteristics is not 
unsually small compared to the studies on U.S. timber auctions reviewed in section 4, so at least 
we can say that we controlled for the effects of tract characteristics on winning bids as well as 
those studies. 
We saw in section 3 that many factors other than collusion and tract characteristics can 
affect winning bids.  We must control for those factors in order to isolate the effects of collusion.  
The fact that regional timber markets are fairly distinct in Romania is one reason, in addition to 
differences in data availability, that we analyze Neamt and Suceava separately.  Due to the lack 
of data, for the most part we were unable to develop variables directly related to the other 
economic and institutional factors.  Instead, we used dummy (0-1) variables to control for them.  
Several of the factors discussed in section 3 can be expected to vary substantially within a forest 
directorate: number of timber sellers other than the NFA, number of timber buyers, and forest 
access.  To capture the effects of these factors, we included dummy variables for the forest 
divisions within the directorates.  To the extent that corruption is present at different levels in 
different forest divisions (perhaps absent altogether in some or many), the same dummies will 
capture its effects.  Because many of these factors have changed over time, we also included 
dummy variables for the dates when the auctions occurred.  The time dimension is especially   28        
important for other factors, such as the AAC and the level of technology in the industry.   While 
the use of dummy variables is fine for the purpose of controlling for potentially confounding 
factors in order to isolate the effects of collusion, it does not allow us to estimate the impact of 
those other factors on winning bids.  The dummy variables are standing in for several “real” 
variables simultaneously. 
5.1.   Econometric analysis of data from Neamt 
5.1.1.  Background 
Neamt is a forest directorate in northeastern Romania just south of Suceava.  The IRIS field team 
obtained data on all timber tracts sold in the directorate between May 1998 and June 2003.  The 
data set included tracts that sold at negotiated prices in addition to tracts that sold by auction.  
The former category evidently includes mainly tracts that were originally offered for sale at 
primary or secondary auctions but failed to sell.  The total of number of tracts in the data set was 
4,513.  Of these, nearly three quarters—3,355 tracts—sold by auction.  Auctions have thus been 
the main mechanism for selling timber tracts in Neamt. 
Table 2 presents basic characteristics of the auction sales during 1999-2003.  Note that 
the data for 2003 cover only the period January-June.  Scheduled sales of mature timber and 
thinnings accounted for most of the sales in terms of both volume and value in all years except 
2002, when windstorms resulted in unusually large salvage sales.  Scheduled sales were reduced 
in that year to maintain harvests within the AAC.  Mature timber accounted for most of the 
scheduled sales in every year, especially in value terms. 
The bottom panel of the table shows mean winning bids per cubic meter, weighted by 
timber volumes.  Like the values for total revenue, these values are expressed in nominal terms.  
Inflation thus accounts at least partially for their tendency to increase over time for most sales 
categories.  Within a given year, the pattern of values is generally what one would expect if bids 
reflect relative timber values: for example, mean winning bids are higher for scheduled sales of 
mature timber than for scheduled sales of thinnings.  Auctions in Neamt at least satisfy this basic 
criterion of allocative efficiency. 
Table 3 presents the same information for timber that sold at negotiated prices.  Data 
were available only through the end of 2002.  To begin, note that the volume and especially the   29        
value of timber sold by negotiation were much less than the corresponding amounts sold by 
auction.  This was true even before October 2001, when NFA Executive Order 6465 banned 
negotiated sales.  Scheduled sales accounted for a smaller proportion of negotiated sales than 
auction sales in all years except the windstorm year of 2002.  Mean negotiated prices were 
typically much less than mean winning bids from auctions.  All of this is consistent with the 
tracts sold by negotiation being the less desirable ones. 
Like most previous studies of timber auctions, we focused our econometric analysis on 
scheduled sales of mature timber.
29  Such tracts accounted for only 869 of the tracts in the Neamt 
data set, but as the amounts in Tables 2 and 3 indicate they accounted for most of the combined 
value of timber sold by auction and negotiations during 1999-2002.  The volume of timber in 
these tracts ranged from 5 to 8,357 cubic meters, with a mean of 1,765 cubic meters.  Winning 
bids ranged from 55,000 to 1,577,000 lei per cubic meter, with a mean of 478,237 lei per cubic 
meter.  The ratio of winning bid to reserve price had a mean value of 1.4.  Some tracts sold for as 
much as 4.6 times the reserve price, which suggests that competition among bidders was at times 
intense. 
The amount of data available for explaining the variation in winning bids was limited.  
This is because very little auction data is computerized in Neamt compared to Suceava.  The 
IRIS field team was able to obtain only the following basic data on each tract:  
•  Name of forest division (ocolul silvic) where the tract was located 
•  Volume of timber in the tract 
•  Type of timber (mature, thinning, salvage) 
•  Auction date  
•  Reserve price 
•  Winning bid 
•  Name of winning bidder 
                                                 
29 Estimating the amount of harvestable timber and the cost of harvesting are more difficult for salvage sales and 
thinnings than for sales of mature timber. Consequently, forestry departments and logging companies have a harder 
time formulating reserve prices and bids, and econometric models of bidding behavior perform more poorly.   30        
The team obtained a small amount of additional information on winning bidders (e.g., 
addresses), but formatting inconsistencies precluded its use.  It did not obtain information on the 
number of companies that registered to bid on a tract, the number that actually bid, or the bids 
they placed, other than the winning bid.   
Due to these data limitations, our test for collusion is much weaker for Neamt than for 
Suceava.  We explain this test in the next section.  We close this section by noting two reasons to 
believe collusion could be common in Neamt.  First, individuals interviewed by the IRIS field 
team in June and July 2003 reported that it is.  They pointed to the fact that just three firms—
Petroforest, Romanel Forest Star Tarcau, and New Star—harvest more than half of the total 
amount of timber sold in the directorate.
30  These firms are somewhat less dominant in the case 
of scheduled sales of mature timber, however, accounting for just over a third of the total amount 
sold by auction. 
Second, and perhaps more convincing, winning bids were barely above the reserve price 
for many tracts.  A visual examination of the cumulative distribution of the ratio of winning bid 
to reserve price revealed a break point at 1.07.  Almost exactly half (436 out of 869) of the 
mature timber tracts sold by auction in Neamt during 1998-2003 had ratios below this value.  
The mean winning bid for these tracts, 349,780 lei per cubic meter, was significantly different 
from the mean winning bid for the tracts with a higher ratio, 607,585 lei per cubic meter.
31  
Hence, lower ratios coincided with lower winning bids.  They were not a consequence of, say, 
reserve prices coincidentally being closer to winning bids for more valuable tracts.  
5.1.2.  Theoretical model and econometric approach 
Following Baldwin et al. (1997), we define: 
  Bi  Winning bid for tract i (lei) 
  ri  Reserve price for tract i (lei) 
  vi  Volume of timber in tract i (cubic meters). 
                                                 
30 These firms also buy timber in neighoring forest directorates. 
31 The means were statistically different regardless of whether we assumed the variances for the two groups were the 
same or different.   31        
We distinguish the observed winning bid per cubic meter, Bi/vi, from the winning bidder’s 
valuation of the tract: the bidder’s maximum willingness to pay.
32  We assume that the valuation 
has a lognormal distribution with mean β′zi and variance σ
2, where 
zi  Vector of covariates that affect valuation of tract i. 
We included as covariates the volume of timber, vi, and the volume squared; the natural 
logarithm of reserve price per cubic meter, ln(ri/vi); and dummy variables for forest division and 
auction date.  We included the reserve price in view of the limited data on tract characteristics.  
As noted in section 2.4, reserve prices are supposed to reflect differences in timber quality and 
accessibility.  The forest division dummies might capture these differences, too.  The dummies 
for auction date control for inflation, market conditions, and differences in auction procedures. 
Our testing procedure amounted to evaluating the relative performance of a reference 
model in which winning bids are assumed to equal bidders’ valuations for all tracts to one in 
which winning bids are assumed to be below valuations for some tracts as a result of collusion.  
More formally, the null hypothesis is that all winning bids, including those close to reserve 
prices, equal actual valuations: 
 ln(Bi/vi) = β′zi + εi  ∀  i. (1) 
The alternative hypothesis is that only winning bids that are not close to reserve prices equal 
actual valuations.  Winning bids that are close to reserve prices instead equal lower bounds on 
actual valuations:  
 ln(Bi/vi) = β′zi + εi  if  Bi/ri  ≥ 1+δ   (2) 
    ln(Bi/vi) ≤ β′zi + εi  if  Bi/ri < 1+δ, 
where δ = 0.07.  We test the null by comparing the log likelihood statistic from model (1), which 
is a simple linear regression model, to the log likelihood statistic from model (2), which is a 
censored regression model.  If the absolute value of the log likelihood statistic from model (2) is 
smaller, then we reject the null and conclude that collusion could be present.  As described in 
                                                 
32 Strictly speaking, the winning bid equals the sum of the actual valuation by the second highest bidder plus the 
additional increment offered by the highest bidder.   32        
more detail in a moment, our analysis does not rule out explanations other than collusion.  If 
instead we fail to reject the null, then we fail to detect evidence of collusion. 
As emphasized, rejection of the null does not necessarily imply that collusion is present.  
Collusion is a type of unobserved heterogeneity: collusion affects some tracts but not all, and we 
cannot directly observe which ones it affects.  Other tract characteristics have this feature, and 
they offer competing explanations why model (2) might outperform model (1).  One such 
characteristic is the order in which tracts are auctioned.  This is a characteristic that in principle 
is easily observable, but we have no data on it for the auctions in Neamt.  So, from our 
standpoint as econometricians, it is unobserved.  To see how it might generate a set of winning 
bids that look the set that results from collusion, consider the following simple example.   
Suppose n bidders attend an auction, and m identical tracts are offered for sale.  The number of 
tracts equals the number of bidders: n = m.  Suppose that, unknown to other bidders, each bidder 
demands only a single tract and is willing to pay the same maximum amount for it.  The high 
bids for the first m-1 tracts in this auction will equal the maximum willingness to pay (the high 
bidders’ actual valuations), but the high bid for the m
th tract will equal the reserve price, because 
the sole remaining bidder has no competitors.  Model (2) would fit the data from this auction 
better than model (1), but the reason would be diminished competition for the final tract, not 
collusion. 
5.1.3.  Results 
Results are shown for Model (1) in Table 4 and Model (2) in Table 5.  The coefficients on the 
timber volume variables and reserve price are highly significant and similar in magnitude in both 
tables. The positive sign on timber volume indicates increasing returns to scale in logging, while 
the negative sign on the squared value of this variable indicates that the scale economies 
diminish with the volume harvested.  The coefficient on reserve price is not significantly 
different from 1.  Given that both this variable and the dependent variable are expressed in 
logarithmic form, the implication is that winning bid is proportional to reserve price, after 
controlling for timber volume, forest division, and auction date.  The coefficients on many of the 
dummy variables for forest division and auction date, which are not shown, were also 
significantly different from zero.   33        
The absolute value of the log likelihood statistic is substantially smaller in Table 5 than in 
Table 4. The censored regression model, in which we assume that actual valuations exceed 
observed winning bids for tracts that sell close to the reserve price, thus fits the data better than 
the standard linear regression model.  We therefore cannot rule out the presence of collusion. We 
investigated the robustness of this result by re-estimating Model (2) with δ set equal to values set 
slightly above and below 0.07: respectively, 0.10, which increased the number of censored 
observations to 449; and 0.06, which decreased the number to 435.  The absolute values of the 
log likelihood statistics were both larger than the value in Table 5.
33  The cutoff value of δ that 
demarcates tracts that have abnormally low winning bids in view of their timber volumes, 
reserve prices, locations, and auction dates does indeed appear to be 0.07. 
We estimated just how low the winning bids for these tracts might be by using the model 
in Table 5 to predict the uncensored values for the tracts.  The mean value across the 436 tracts 
was 669,302 lei per cubic meter, which is much larger than the mean of the actual winning bids 
for the tracts, 349,780 lei per cubic meter, but not significantly different from the mean winning 
bid for the 433 uncensored tracts, 607,585 lei per cubic meter.   
5.1.4.  Conclusions: Neamt 
We conclude that collusion could be affecting the winning bids in many of the tracts sold in 
Neamt timber auctions by a large amount.  Although our results are strongly suggestive, we 
cannot rule out other factors as explanations for the unusually low bids for these tracts.   
Developing a more definitive test of collusion requires a richer data set, such as the one from 
Suceava.  We turn to that analysis now. 
5.2.  Econometric analysis of data from Suceava 
Our analysis of Suceava relies on variations of Models 1 and 2 in Baldwin et al. (1997). 
5.2.1.  Data 
A wealth of information was collected for Suceava by the IRIS team in Romania, including 
auction, firm, and tract information. Auction data consists of the actual order and amount of bids 
for each tract. Firm information is mostly location, plus, for four 2002 auctions (March 5, April 
                                                 
33 70.2 and 61.4, respectively.   34        
20, April 30, and June 19), contract information as well as the maximum authorized annual 
processing volume of timber. Tract data includes tract location information (such as forestry, 
production, and management units), volume, area, reserve price, bidding step, various forestry, 
cutting, and product codes, as well as the high bid and the number of bids. 
Table 6 summarizes the number of registered bidders for each tract (by auction date) for 
tracts sold separately in the 27 different auctions for which we have data.  We observe that 
“large” auctions tend to be followed after a few days by much smaller ones (presumably 
secondary auctions for tracts which failed to sell at the primary auctions) which appear to be 
much less competitive, assuming that the mean number of registered bidders per tract gives an 
indication of the degree of competition to buy the tracts for sale.  Over time, it appears that the 
mean number of bidders has been increasing: the three largest means for the number of bidders 
are to be found among the four 2002 auctions. It does not imply, however, that auctions have 
become more competitive, as shown by the mean number of bids per tract in Table 7. With the 
exception of the March 5, 2002 auction, the big auctions of 2002 (in April and June) rank second 
and fourth from the bottom in terms of the mean number of bids per tract. Worse, there is on 
average only one bid per registered bidder for these two auctions. 
For this report, we focus on the April 20, 2002 and June 19, 2002 auctions.  The main 
reason for this choice is the availability of contract information, which also tells us about supply 
constraints for the firms participating in these auctions.  This information is critical for our 
methodology, recognizing that what could be interpreted as the result of collusive activities may 
in fact be due to changes in the supply of timber.  After eliminating records for non-mature 
timber and for tracts sold in groups or tracts with only one registered bidder, as well as 
incomplete or clearly erroneous records (e.g., a few tracts had a negative area) and tracts with 
less than 100 cubic meters of timber (an unusually small amount), we are left with 615 
observations: 387 for the April 20, 2002 auction and 228 for the June 19, 2002 auction.  
Table 8 presents a summary of some of the key variables for the tracts we consider. 
Unfortunately, we have little direct information about the cost of harvesting timber for each tract. 
Although location may play a role (see Table 9 for forest divisions in Suceava), we need to rely 
on variables such as area (ceteris paribus, it may be costlier to harvest timber on a larger area), or   35        
cod_produs (see Table 10). Unfortunately, there is no variation of harvesting system in our 
sample (see Table 11). 
Ideally, following Baldwin et al. (1996), we would like to have information about the 
inventory of the auction participants. A higher inventory would likely lessen the urgency to 
acquire new timber and therefore should lead to lower timber prices. Since this information is 
unavailable, we construct a crude index of the supply situation by dividing the volume of timber 
under contract for the auction participants (at the beginning of each auction) by their annual 
authorized timber volume. This information is stored in the variable CapRatio in Table 8. 
For the 615 tracts of mature timber we analyze, the volume of timber ranged from 100 to 
11420 cubic meters (mean: 1521 m
3); tract area varied between 0.05 ha and 512.7 ha, with a 
mean of 71.5 ha.  The corresponding high bids per m
3 ranged from a low of 173,000 lei to a high 
of 1,009,000 lei, with a mean of 480,944 lei (1 USD = 33,933.50 lei).  The mean number of bids 
per tract was 8.54, with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 46. 
5.2.2.  Theoretical models and econometric approach 
Throughout this analysis, we assume that the hypotheses of the standard independent private 
values (IPV) model hold (see Milgrom and Weber 1982). The IPV framework seems to make 
sense here because mills often have different production costs and holdings of uncut timber. In 
addition, a number of theoretical results are available in this framework and not in others.  
Key assumptions of the IPV model include: 
•  Bidders are risk neutral. 
•  All bidders are equally well informed about the quality and quantity of timber on any 
given tract.  This is one reason why we are restricting our analysis to mature timber sales, 
which are almost all second-growth; second-growth timber is typically more homogenous 
than old-growth timber.  
•  Bidders also have the same information about future potential price movements, although 
in practice large firms may have an information advantage if they are involved in export 
markets or have better government connections. 
Although some of these assumptions are not very satisfactory, they are necessary to implement 
our theoretical models.   36        
As a starting point, we consider two models. One of their main roles is to explain low 
winning bids. One potential reason is the presence of collusion, but this is by no means the only 
possible explanation.  Demand for timber could also be depressed by a number of factors, which 
we try to capture through covariates. These factors could be linked for example to timber quality 
or to supply constraints. We try to capture some of the latter through the variable CapRatio. 
As in the analysis of Neamt auctions, we define: 
Bi  Winning bid for tract i (lei); 
ri  Reserve price for tract i (lei); 
vi  Volume of timber in tract i (cubic meters). 
In addition, we define  
ni  Number of registered bidders for tract i. 
We also suppose that observed winning bid per cubic meter, ln(Bi/vi) is normally 
distributed with mean β′zi and variance σ
2 where zi is a vector of covariates.  This is a convenient 
assumption also used in Baldwin et al. (1997).  Covariates considered include: 
•  Volume of timber on a tract for sale (cubic meters). Indeed, it has been suggested that 
there are increasing returns with volume of a tract. 
•  Square of the volume of timber, for non-linear effects. 
•  Area of a tract, in hectares. We supposed that the area of a tract could impact logging 
costs. 
•  Dummy variables for the NFA ID codes for forest divisions, to capture unobserved 
specific circumstances in different forest divisions (see Table 9). 
•  Type of timber sale (cod_produs; see Table 10). 
•  CapRatio, which equals the volume of firms partaking in an auction divided by their 
annual authorized volume of timber. 
Unfortunately, we had no data on actual logging costs or timber quality. A first step of 
our model selection process is to select what covariates we want to use in our two models. 
Preliminary regression helped us make a first selection among these covariates. We found that 
dummy variables for forest divisions were all insignificant, so we did not include them in the 
remainder of this analysis. Likewise, timber type (cod_produs) was not significant at 5%. By   37        
contrast, all the other covariates are strongly significant and have the expected signs: positive for 
volume (more timber increases the value of a tract), negative for volume
2 (there may be 
diminishing scale economies with the volume harvested, as for Neamt), negative for area (less 
timber per unit area decreases value), and strongly negative for CapRatio (as firms are close to 
their annual maximum harvest, they have less of an incentive to purchase rights to new timber). 
Table 12 presents a regression without the forest division variables. 
As mentioned in the previous section, we observe only the number of bidders willing to 
pay at least the reserve price. We should therefore model the value distribution as a distribution 
censored from below by the reservation price, which varies from tract to tract.  In our dataset of 
615 observations, 94 observations are within 1.055 of the reservation price. In order to take 
advantage of the information contained in these observations, we censor them by discarding their 
actual value but we retain that they are within 5.5% of the reserve price.  
We are now ready to present our 2 models. Model 1 assumes non-cooperative behavior in 
an English auction with unit supply. It follows that the winner will pay the second highest 
valuation overall. Baldwin et al. (1997) show that the corresponding likelihood function is 
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β is the unknown vector of coefficients of the covariates zi; 
σ
2 is the unknown variance of the distribution of ln(Bi/vi); 
D is our data set; 
Ia is the set of uncensored high bids; 
Ib is the set of censored high bids; 
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ni is the numbers of bidders for auction i; 
f2(ui|ri,ni) and F2(ui|ri,ni) are respectively the density and the distributions of the 2
nd order 
statistics of n independent draws from a standardized normal distribution truncated from 
below by ri.    38        
More generally, if fα(ui|ri,ni) and Fα (ui|ri,ni) are respectively the density and the 
distributions of the α
th order statistics of n independent draws, from a standardized normal 
distribution truncated from below by ri, then 
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where φ(·) and Φ(·) are respectively the standard normal density and cumulative distribution 
functions. 
Model 2 is a model of collusion in an English auction with unit supply. If a coalition 
contains k bidders with the k-highest values and not the k+1
st one, then the coalition will pay the 
latter. Using the same notation as for Model 1, the likelihood function for Model 2 is 
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In the above, γ is an unknown parameter that needs to be estimated from the data.  
Models 1 and 2 were estimated using a program written in GAUSS after managing the 
data in STATA. It should be emphasized that the log likelihood functions for Models 1 and 2 are 
difficult to estimate because they admit local maxima. After unsuccessfully trying to find their 
maximum using the Gauss procedure optimum, we switched to a simulated annealing algorithm   39        
which is much more robust and much more reliable for maximizing functions of several 
variables (see Corana et al., 1987). 
5.2.3.  Results 
Results of our maximum likelihood estimations are summarized in Tables 13A and 13B. Our 
best estimates for both models do not include volume squared, which no longer appears to be 
significant. For Model 1, we see that all variables are significant (at 5% at least) and they have 
the expected sign (see the discussion above). For Model 2, we obtain very interesting results: 
volume is now insignificant, and most importantly pi, the estimate of the probability that a bidder 
joins a coalition at auction i is now quite high and very significant: inserting γ=1.2358 from 
Table 13B in (8) leads to pi=0.775. The signs of the other coefficients are as expected. In 
addition, we find that the value of the logarithm of the likelihood function for Model 2 is much 
higher than for Model 1; a likelihood ratio test is significant at 1%. Note, however, that caution is 
necessary when interpreting this test because the probability of collusion is at the boundary of its 
permissible domain under the null hypothesis; we know from Andrews (2001) for example, that 
this situation causes difficulties similar to unidentification so standard asymptotics may fail.  An 
approach similar to the one used by Khalaf, Saphores, and Bilodeau (2003) in a different context 
may be used to address this problem. 
These results suggest nevertheless that the collusive model with unit supply (Model 2) 
clearly outperforms our non-cooperative model with unit supply (Model 1) for the auctions that 
took place in Suceava on April 20, 2002 and on June 19, 2002. 
5.2.4.  Conclusions: Suceava 
These results suggest the presence of collusion during the 2002 forestry auctions in Suceava.  
They are in line with anecdotal comments gathered by the IRIS field research team during the 
collection of the data used in this report. It is important to emphasize that these findings are not 
very surprising, given results from studies that found evidence of collusion in forestry auctions in 
the United States for example (see Baldwin et al., 1996). 
However, these results are still preliminary. In future work, the lognormal assumption 
should be checked; more elaborate auction models, especially Models 3-5 in Baldwin et al.   40        
(1987), should be evaluated; and a better parameterization of the probability that a firm will join 
a coalition should be attempted. 
 
6.0 Conclusions 
This paper has attempted to detect collusion in Romanian forestry auctions for two forest 
directorates, Neamt and Suceava, using two different econometric methodologies to reflect data 
availability.  Neamt was the first forest directorate in Romania to introduce timber auctions. 
Unfortunately, relatively little data was available electronically. For example, the research team 
could not get electronic records of important tract characteristics such as the composition of 
timber by size class and species group, which contributes to the value of a tract, or the distance 
of a tract to the nearest forestry road, which contributes to harvesting costs. A lack of resources 
also precluded the collection of information about mill location and the density of forestry roads. 
In addition, detailed bidding information including the number of bidders for each tract was 
unavailable. Some of these limitations also existed for Suceava. 
The data analyzed for Neamt is a subset of scheduled sales of mature timber between 
1999 and 2002. Our testing procedure contrasted the maximum likelihood of a simple regression 
model in which winning bids were assumed to equal bidders’ valuations for all tracts, to a 
censored regression model that isolated tracts where the winning bid was within 7% of the 
reservation price. We found that the censored regression model fits the data better than the 
standard linear regression model, so we cannot rule out the presence of collusion, although 
collusion is not the only possible explanation for this better fit. 
Our analysis of timber auctions in Suceava, which focused on 2002 auctions, provides 
stronger evidence of collusion. Detailed bidding information, including the order and the size of 
each bid, was available, and this allowed us to use more powerful econometric models that also 
start to account for supply effects. In our analysis, we contrasted two models in an English 
auction with unit supply: Model 1 assumed competitive behavior, while Model 2 assumed that a 
subset of bidders colludes to lower the winning bid. Our results show that the collusive model 
(Model 2) strongly outperforms the competitive model (Model 1) for the auctions analyzed.  
While these models are not yet entirely satisfactory—partly because auction theory is still 
lagging behind actual auction design and practice but also because of potential econometric 
complications—these results suggest the presence of collusion in Romanian forestry auctions.   41        
These findings reinforce anecdotal evidence gathered by the IRIS field team in Neamt, where 
just three firms harvest more than half of the total amount of timber sold in that directorate and 
are alleged to engage in collusive bidding. 
Collusion in auctions is by no means unique to Romania or to developing economies. As 
discussed in section 4, collusion has also been detected in U.S. Forest Service auctions and in 
other U.S. markets where auctions are used, including highway construction and milk contracts 
for schools. Auctions offer a very useful mechanism for allocating contracts, however, and they 
are likely to become increasingly popular as developing economies try to increase their 
competitiveness. As in other markets, it is necessary to ensure transparency and the respect of 
ground-rules to maintain competition and confidence in the economic institutions. In this regard, 
it is reassuring that increasingly sophisticated and powerful econometric methods are becoming 
available to detect instances where these rules are violated and collusion occurs. 
For Romania, this study suggests that efforts should be made to systematically collect and 
make available data to enable ongoing analyses of forestry auctions. In addition to information 
on individual bids for each tract (bid level, bid order, and bidder identity), these data should 
include basic firm information (such as mill location and capabilities) and tract information (tree 
species and their corresponding volume as well as basic parameters that determine harvesting 
costs).  Even with enhanced electronic availability of data, we doubt that “real-time” analysis of 
Romanian timber auctions will be possible.  Instead, we envision a situation in which analysts, 
perhaps local academics working under contract for the Ministry or some other appropriate 
government agency, would annually apply the sorts of methods presented in this report to data 
from auctions during the past year.  They would prepare a sort of “Timber Auction 
Competitiveness Report.”  The aim would be identify forest directorates where collusion is more 
likely to be occurring.  The government could then use this information to conduct targeted 
investigations and implement measures to reduce collusion and its consequences. 
What types of anti-collusion measures are available to the government?  Discussion of 
this point in HIID (1996, p. 2) remains relevant: 
Governments can take several actions to reduce the risks and consequences of imperfect 
competition in stumpage auctions.  One is to adopt and enforce anti-collusion laws.   
Reportedly, such a law will go into effect in Romania on January 1, 1997.  A second is to 
minimize (but not necessarily eliminate) the requirements that bidders must satisfy to 
participate in auctions.  …  A third action is to coordinate the dates of auctions with the   42        
forestry calendar, to ensure that more timber is offered for sale when demand (and thus 
potential competition) is high.  Romsilva [i.e., the NFA] faces rules [related to the AAC 
allocation] that reportedly violate this principle.  …  A fourth action … is to employ 
starting prices (reserve prices) as a means of preventing eventual winning prices from 
being too far below fair market values. 
Klemperer (2004), in a recent and influential book on auction design, emphasizes low entry 
barriers and economically meaningful reserve prices as “what really matter” in fighting 
collusion.
34  The most obvious entry barrier in Romanian timber auctions is the prohibition 
against foreign participation.  The government could consider relaxing this rule in forest 
directorates where there is evidence of collusion among domestic companies.  Publication of 
forest management plans might also lead to a more rational spatial distribution of mills with 
regard to available timber supplies, reducing the number of instances where only a few mills are 
located in close proximity to areas where many tracts are scheduled for auction. 
The HIID (1996) report was motivated by the government’s interest in developing 
improved procedures for setting reserve prices, in part to combat collusion.  It concluded that the 
government could make better use of winning prices in past auctions to set reserve prices in 
upcoming auctions.  This method is termed transactions analysis.  It amounts to setting the 
reserve prices for new tracts equal to winning prices for comparable tracts that sold in past 
auctions, minus a margin to reduce the risk of overstating the value of a tract and causing it to go 
unsold.   Statistical techniques are used to calculate comparable prices.  This method is used 
routinely in timber auctions in western countries.  A disadvantage is that if collusion is common, 
then basing reserve prices on winning prices from past auctions will simply perpetuate the 
downward pressure of collusion on winning prices.  A solution to this problem is to use 
techniques like the ones presented in this paper to identify tracts where bidding appears to have 
been affected by collusion and remove them from the database used to set reserve prices. 
A second method is residual value analysis, which considers the difference between log 
prices and logging costs.  This method is also commonly used, but it relies on information that is 
                                                 
34 A fine (but not unimportant) point is whether governments should reveal their reserve prices to bidders.  Policies 
vary in recently created timber auction systems.  In Cameroon, as in Romania, reserve prices are made public before 
auctions.  In Ghana, however, they are revealed only if none of the received bids exceeds them.  Revealing reserve 
prices to bidders certainly makes it easier for colluding bidders to determine how low they can go and still be 
awarded a tract.    43        
less directly observable by the government (i.e., information about logging costs).  Largely for 
this reason, the HIID report concluded that transactions analysis was the more suitable method 
for setting reserve prices in Romanian timber auctions.  This conclusion is even more likely to be 
correct today, given the decade of additional data on winning bids and tract characteristics that 
can in principle be used to establish the market value of tracts yet to be auctioned.  Implementing 
transactions analysis will be hindered in Romania, however, until a more comprehensive and 
consistent effort is made to computerize auction data across forest directorates. 
   44        
Table 1.  Scheduled sales of mature timber at Romanian timber auctions held during January-July, 2003 



















































Central Alba  96,154 597,356 44,171 615,862 39,730 602,580  5,076 658,134 6,610 410,646 567 422,227
  Brasov  58,961 542,455 8,540 660,718 44,720 541,285  1,797 444,857 3,904 342,088    
 Cluj    58,600 575,598 19,745 746,163 29,447 538,809  1,985 699,235 7,423 234,780   
  Hunedoara  180,195 580,241 47,481 600,101 120,996 585,281  6,806 531,170 4,912 332,106    
 Salaj  28,391 974,933 2 281,000 16,210 1,044,64 9,021 1,035,507 2,629 425,968 529 536,554
  Sibiu  70,491 705,101 34,609 666,902 20,584 781,282  7,908 839,604 7,085 532,877 305 411,536
Danube Constanta  30,990 466,872         3,989 570,920 27,001 451,501
  Dolj  83,248 474,746         14,013 568,509 16,536 437,329 52,699 461,555
 Ialomita  185,739 511,557         9,783 841,972 175,956 493,186
  Mehedinti  106,420 451,671     77,656 458,008  9,227 524,224 5,986 366,136 13,551 403,738
 Olt  23,663 522,829      6,690 742,113 3,803 558,041 13,170 401,270
  Tulcea  47,587 448,046         1,217 438,000 3,444 340,000 42,926 457,000
East Botosani  25,878 944,329    11,852 1,203,84 2,071 1,498,226 3,048 750,752 8,907 536,458
  Iasi  98,859 908,310 373 667,716 19,858 916,193  14,840 1,579,692 26,090 848,010 37,698 683,977
 Vaslui  42,914 681,868    13,073 817,807 5,021 1,021,284 8,952 456,716 15,868 589,496
  Vrancea  150,768 892,515 10,467 695,421 94,349 968,199  7,801 1,954,600 12,489 654,621 25,662 487,556
Northeast Bacau    361,430 638,880 76,876 529,606 263,705 667,666 2,334 786,530 3,675 565,255 14,840 688,440
  Covasna  55,490 661,540 20,537 701,115 32,527 603,174  2,426 1,109,069        
 Harghita  84,185 680,674 77,590 697,738 6,595 479,912         
  Maramures  231,376 663,994 68,345 591,492 153,813 672,022  8,110 1,151,127 1,108 456,085    
 Mures  187,336 648,292 121,641 675,714 49,382 596,845  5,571 797,703 9,170 494,216 1,572 511,760
  Neamt  466,192 660,448 333,592 651,406 109,721 674,213  4,736 1,168,285 10,515 691,121 7,628 500,297
 Suceava  1,444,07 555,539 1,399,58 552,225 44,489 659,824       4 83,820   45        
 
Table 1.  Scheduled sales of mature timber (continued) 




















































West  Arad   171,584 716,942 2,248 415,651 71,716 777,235 60,497 783,504 28,759 432,769 8,364 776,610
  Bihor  122,060  631,882 12,697 755,056 73,243 603,479  20,341 722,976 14,950 542,037 829 639,937
 Satu  Mare  35,753 886,517 1,822 540,000 13,575 851,223 17,407 1,004,050 2,456 523,280 493 798,645
  Timis  127,006  745,893 4,786 602,593 44,805 683,461  54,440 848,410 17,625 650,246 5,350 668,852
South Arges  118,279 813,461 13,321 870,143 94,425 766,888  6,960 1,491,153 3,515 514,632 58 403,000
  Bistrita N.  4,084  462,271 4,024 464,000   33 444,700 27 226,000
 Bucuresti  68,775 689,448  12,139 1,264,595 13,877 854,625 42,759 472,561
  Buzau  112,553  653,925 32,278 543,242 50,334 609,616  11,906 1,138,211 13,885 756,021 4,150 321,228
 Dâmbovita  59,720 915,377 805 680,000 24,236 637,469  27,381 1,229,930 4,749 744,517 2,549 571,504
  Gorj  130,915  571,003 5,218 528,095 113,784 568,504  7,827 617,442 4,086 606,425
 ICAS  217,376 800,273 155,952 832,307 53,695 663,738  5,637 1,352,552 2,080 426,968 12 705,196
  Prahova  154,280  649,811 45,892 767,423 92,835 581,318  6,535 1,121,260 900 298,554 8,118 427,618
 Teleorman  26,594  613,040  9,467 994,821 940 625,000 16,187 389,060
  Valcea  152,901  692,214 16,926 745,679 104,145 642,104  20,542 1,049,892 6,720 357,901 4,568 519,918
Southwest Caras  Severin  323,620  630,040 17,533 532,432 233,782 633,176  27,289 777,975 21,139 574,906 23,877 550,743
Totals  5,944,445 639,154 2,577,056 607,050 2,119,282 661,918 405,051 950,320 282,773 579,667 560,283 505,779
Source: Romanian National Forestry Utility 
Notes:     *Volumes are totals for the 7-month period. 
**Winning bids are weighted-average means.  Winning bids in italics are ones that are below the national mean.  46        
Table 2.  Summary data on timber sold by auction in Neamt Forest Directorate 
Year  Characteristic  Type of sale 
1999 2000 2001 2002  2003* 
Scheduled: mature timber  263.6 476.3 477.9 157.0 100.3
Scheduled: thinning  73.8 74.4 119.4 69.2 93.1
Salvage: mature timber  140.3 86.1 64.2 459.9 63.6
Salvage: immature timber  7.0 0.8 2.7 9.9 2.7
Salvage: diseased timber  0.8 6.9 22.3 1.6 0.0




% Scheduled  69% 85% 87% 32% 74%
    
Scheduled: mature timber  85.6 280.8 272.7 93.1 72.7
Scheduled: thinning  8.2 14.6 26.5 13.9 29.6
Salvage: mature timber  34.1 20.9 31.4 242.5 38.0
Salvage: immature timber  1.8 0.1 1.2 2.5 1.1
Salvage: diseased timber  0.1 2.6 6.3 0.5 0.0
Total  129.8 319.0 338.2 352.4 141.3
Total revenue 
(billion lei) 
% Scheduled  72% 93% 89% 30% 72%
    
Scheduled: mature timber  325 590 571 593 724
Scheduled: thinning  110 196 222 201 318
Salvage: mature timber  243 243 489 527 597
Salvage: immature timber  261 120 420 249 402
Mean winning bid 
(thousand lei per m
3) 
Salvage: diseased timber  119 369 283 313 -
Source: Romanian National Forestry Utility, Neamt branch. 
* For 2003, January-June only.   47        
Table 3.  Summary data on timber sold by negotiation in Neamt Forest Directorate 
Year  Characteristic  Type of sale 
1999 2000 2001 2002 
Scheduled: mature timber  22.3 48.0 0.9 29.1
Scheduled: thinning  39.4 40.5 6.5 0.0
Salvage: mature timber  49.8 39.2 2.5 14.5
Salvage: immature timber  3.7 1.7 0.1 1.3
Salvage: diseased timber  0.1 3.2 0.0 0.0




% Scheduled  54% 67% 74% 65%
    
Scheduled: mature timber  3.7 11.7 0.4 12.7
Scheduled: thinning  3.0 3.2 0.7 0.0
Salvage: mature timber  5.9 6.8 0.6 7.1
Salvage: immature timber  0.3 0.2 0.0 0.3
Salvage: diseased timber  0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0
Total  12.9 22.4 1.8 20.1
Total revenue 
(billion lei) 
% Scheduled  52% 67% 65% 63%
    
Scheduled: mature timber  164 243 468 437
Scheduled: thinning  77 80 114 -
Salvage: mature timber  118 174 244 492
Salvage: immature timber  83 122 173 204
Mean price 
(thousand lei per m
3) 
Salvage: diseased timber  75 137 - 205
Source: Romanian National Forestry Utility, Neamt branch.   48        
Table 4.  Estimation results for model (1), Neamt. 
Generalized linear model                               No. of obs      =       869 
Optimization     :  ML: Newton-Raphson                Residual df     =       809 
Log likelihood   = -122.9747963                      AIC             =  .4211158 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
   ln(Bi/vi) |      Coef.     Std. Err.      z         P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
   ln(ri/vi)  |    1.06333     .0491702    21.63   0.000     .9669586    1.159702 
          vi    |   .0000641     .0000232     2.77    0.006     .0000187    .0001095 
         vi
2    |  -9.79e-09     4.08e-09    -2.40     0.016    -1.78e-08   -1.80e-09 
  Constant |  -.2070782     .5604832    -0.37    0.712    -1.305605    .8914486 
_____________________________________________________ 
Note: Model also includes 23 dummy variables for forest division (dummy for Bicaz is omitted) 
and 34 dummy variables for auction date (dummy for May 14, 1998 auction is omitted). 
 
Table 5.  Estimation results for model (2), Neamt. 
 
Censored normal regression                          Number of obs    =        869 
                                                      LR chi2(59)      =     918.92 
                                                      Prob > chi2       =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -60.849009                         Pseudo R2         =     0.8831 
___________________________________________________________ 
   ln(Bi/vi) |      Coef.     Std. Err.      t        P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
___________________________________________________________ 
   ln(ri/vi)  |   .9819834     .0551903    17.79     0.000     .8736505    1.090316 
          vi    |   .0000733     .0000269     2.73     0.007     .0000205     .000126 
         vi
2    |  -1.04e-08     4.66e-09    -2.24     0.025    -1.96e-08   -1.29e-09 
  Constant |   .7978003     .6301034     1.27     0.206    -.4390278    2.034628 
___________________________________________________________ 
         _se |   .2514063     0079685           (Ancillary parameter) 
___________________________________________________________ 
  Obs. summary:          433  uncensored observations 
                           436 right-censored observations 
Note: Model also includes 23 dummy variables for forest division (dummy for Bicaz is omitted) 
and 34 dummy variables for auction date (dummy for May 14, 1998 auction is omitted).  49        
 
Table 6.  Statistics on the number of registered bidders for tract by auction date 
___________________________________________________________ 
Auction   #  of     Standard   Min  Max 
Date   Tracts   Mean   Deviation 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
09  Feb  00  230   3.31   1.92   1  10 
16  Feb  00  34   1.26   0.62   1  3 
15  Mar  00  75   2.12   1.05   1  5 
22  Mar  00  28   1.25   0.52   1  3 
07  Apr  00    147   3.01   1.76   1  8 
21  Apr  00  41   1.32   0.65   1  3 
14  Jun  00  106   2.21   1.04   1  6 
16  Jun  00    25   1.16   0.37   1  2 
25  Aug  00  156   3.62   1.77   1  10 
30  Aug  00  17   1.53   0.51   1  2 
08  Sep  00  170   5.28   2.64   1  12 
13  Sep  00  16   1.38   0.72   1  3 
06  Dec  00  83   6.01   2.53   1  12 
09  Feb  01  283   4.88   2.65   1  12 
14  Feb  01  22   1.14   0.35   1  2 
02  May  01  364   6.52   3.46   1  18 
09  May  01  19   2.00   0.75   1  3 
29  Jun  01  355   7.62   3.64   1  18 
04  Jul  01 13   3.00   0.41   2  4 
31  Aug  01  284   4.80   2.35   1  12 
04  Sep  01  17   2.24   0.90   1  4 
31  Oct  01  417   6.89   3.21   1  21 
07  Nov  01  12   2.42   0.67   2  4 
05  Mar  02  228   8.73   4.12   1  20 
20  Apr  02  450   8.48   4.06   1  28 
30  Apr  02  6   2.50   1.38   1  4 
19  Jun  02  371   9.76   5.30   1  26 
All   3969   6.06   4.07   1  28 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes. These statistics are based on the “Ofert” file, which includes only tracts sold separately. For 397 
tracts, there was a single registered bidder.   50        
Table 7.  Statistics on the number of bids by auction date 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
Auction   #  of     Standard   Min  Max 
Date   Tracts   Mean   Deviation 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
20000209  190   8.34   10.19   1  49 
20000216  8   2.13   2.48   1  8 
20000315  56   10.34   12.97   2  51 
20000322  6   2.33   816   2  4 
20000407  110   13.24   13.22   1  54 
20000421  9   8.89   9.56   1  29 
20000614  83   5.70   12.90   1  100 
20000616 4   1   0   1 1 
20000825  140   8.91   10.67   1  47 
20000830  7   3.71   7.18   1  20 
20000908  158   10.70   12.03   1  73 
20000913  4   2.25   0.96   1  3 
20001206  81   11.99   10.20   1  37 
20010209  262   10.53   13.64   1  56 
20010214  6   5.33   9.67   1  25 
20010502  342   13.20   17.68   1  95 
20010509  20   1   0   1  1 
20010629  348   14.36   17.46   1  75 
20010704  16   1   0   1  1 
20010831  263   9.38   12.01   1  73 
20010904  15   2.53   1.19   2  6 
20011031  409   15.89   14.32   1  69 
20011107  12   2.58   1.00   2  5 
20020305  231   22.22   16.80   1  102 
20020420  641   8.87   9.38   1  70 
20020430  8   3.63   4.31   1  13 
20020619  790   8.04   7.48   1  48 
20020625  58   3.26   3.88   2  19 
All   4279   10.96   13.07   1  102 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes. These statistics are based on the “auction_data_2000-2001-2002” file. It includes all tracts.   51        
Table 8.  Summary Statistics for the Auction Data Analyzed 
Auction Date: April 20, 2002. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variable   Obs  Mean   Std.  Dev. Min   Max 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Volume   387  1470.106 1233.288 108   8678 
Area   387  61.68269 65.85765 0.6   512.7 
up   387  3.45478   2.00773   0   10 
cu   387  9.18863   6.496557 1   21 
cod_produs 387  5.656331  0.4755471  5    6 
cod_taiere  387  35   0   35   35 
ResPrice   387  341257.5 41397.82 220221   436790 
WinBid   387  504423.8 149951.1 232000   1009000 
Nbids   387  9.095607 8.064742 1   46 
CapRatio 387  0.1892   0   0.1892   0.1892 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Auction Date: June 19, 2002. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variable   Obs  Mean   Std.  Dev. Min   Max 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Volume   228  1607.307 1415.558 100   11420 
Area   228  88.09772 84.61378 0.05   423.2 
up   228  3.175439 1.566419 0   8 
cu   228  14.59211 4.258739 8   21 
cod_produs 228  5.671053  0.4708646  5    6 
cod_taiere  228  35   0   35   35 
ResPrice   228  313829.7 47660.49 156107   415518 
WinBid   228  441092.1 124478.6 173000   809000 
Nbids   228  7.600877 6.529054 1   32 
CapRatio 228  0.2625   0   0.2625   0.2625 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes. Volume is in cubic meters. Area is in ha. Cod_produs 5 or 6 indicate felling in large areas affected 
by windthrows. Cod_taiere is the NFA ID code for a harvesting system; “cu” is the NFA ID code for a 
forest division (ocolul silvic); “up” is the production unit where tracts are located. ResPrice is the 
reservation price in lei / m
3. WinBid is the winning bid in lei / m
3. Nbids is the number of bids per tract. 
CapRatio is the ratio of timber under contract divided by the annual authorized amount of timber for all 
firms who registered in an auction.   52        
Table 9.  NFA ID codes and names for forest divisions (ocolul silvic, cu) 
Forestry Unit 
Code COD  Forestry  Unit 
Chief of Forestry 
Unit  Foresty Unit Sub-units 
1  BROSTENI  OS Brosteni  ing.Palade Radu  Ocolul Silvic Brosteni 
2  CRUCEA  OS Crucea  ing.Palade Petru  Ocolul Silvic Crucea 
3  DORNACAN OS Dorna Candreni  ing.Boghean Petru  Ocolul Silvic Dorna Candreni 
4  COSNA  OS Cosna  ing.Birladeanu B.  Ocolul Silvic Cosna 
5  VATRADOR OS Vatra Dornei  ing.Carcea Maria  Ocolul Silvic Vatra Dornei 
6  IACOBENI  OS Iacobeni  ing.Fodor Mihai  Ocolul Silvic Iacobeni 
7  CIRLIBAB OS  Cƒrlibaba  ing.Turcanu C.  Ocolul Silvic Cƒrlibaba 
8  BREAZA  OS Breaza  ing.Coman Constantin  Ocolul Silvic Breaza 
9  POJORITA OS  Pojorƒta  ing.Solovastru V.  Ocolul Silvic Pojorƒta 
10  VAMA  OS Vama  ing.Malis Vasile  Ocolul Silvic Vama 
11  MOLDOVIT OS  Moldovita  ing.Selaru  Vasile Ocolul  Silvic  Moldovita 
12  FRASIN  OS Frasin  ing.Gingolia Dan  Ocolul Silvic Frasin 
13  STULPICA  OS Stulpicani  ing.Miros Radu  Ocolul Silvic Stulpicani 
15  SOLCA  OS Solca  ing.Cotoar† Petru  Ocolul Silvic Solca 
16  MARGINEA OS  Marginea  ing.Totoescu Adrian  Ocolul Silvic Marginea 
17  PUTNA  OS Putna  ing.Chidovet Stelian  Ocolul Silvic Putna 
18  FALCAU  OS Falc†u  ing.Mutescu Ioan  Ocolul Silvic Falc†u 
19  BRODINA  OS Brodina  ing.Hlodec Vasile  Ocolul Silvic Brodina 
20  MALIN  OS M†lini  ing.Vod† Petru  Ocolul Silvic M†lini 
21  RISCA  OS Rƒsca  ing.Stefan Dan  Ocolul Silvic Rƒsca 
22  FALTICEN  OS F†lticeni  ing.Negura Gheorghe  Ocolul Silvic F†lticeni 
        
Note. “Cu” is the NFA ID code for a forest division (ocolul silvic). 
  
  Table 10.  Types of Timber Sales (Cod_produs) 
Code Translation 
1  Salvage I (not in areas affected by windthrows I) 
2  Salvage I ((not in areas affected by windthrows II) 
3  Felling in areas affected by windthrows (I) 
4  Felling in areas affected by windthrows (II) 
5  Felling in large areas affected by windthrows (I) 
6  Felling in large areas affected by windthrows (II) 
7  Thinning 
8  Sanitary Felling 
   53        









1  rase pe parchete mici  1  Clearcuts 
2  rase in benzi  1  Clearcuts in stripes 
3  succesive in margine de masiv  2  Uniform shelterwood system felling - stand edge 
4  succesive 1  2  Uniform shelterwood system felling 
5  succesive 2  2  Uniform shelterwood system felling 
6  succesive 3  2  Uniform shelterwood system felling 
7  succesive 4  2  Uniform shelterwood system felling 
8  succesive definitive  2  Uniform shelterwood system felling (final felling) 
9 
progresive in margine de 
masiv  3 
Group/non-uniform shelterwood system felling (Progressive) - 
stand edge 
10  progresive 1  3 
Group/non-uniform shelterwood system felling (Progressive) -
final felling 
11  progresive 2  3  Group/non-uniform shelterwood system felling (Progressive)  
12  progresive 3  3  Group/non-uniform shelterwood system felling (Progressive)  
13  progresive 4  3  Group/non-uniform shelterwood system felling (Progressive)  
14  progresive -racordare  3  Group/non-uniform shelterwood system felling (Progressive)  
15  cvasigradinarite 1  4  Group selection system felling 
16  cvasigradinarite 2  4  Group selection system felling 
17  cvasigradinarite 3  4  Group selection system felling 
18  cvasigradinarite 4  4  Group selection system felling 
19  cvasigradinarite 5  4  Group selection system felling 
20  cvasigradinarite 6  4  Group selection system felling 
21  cvasigradinarite definitive  4  Group selection system felling - final felling 
22  gradinarite  4  Selection system and conversion to selection system felling 
23  transformare spre gradinarit  4  Selection system and conversion to selection system felling 
24  in cadrul lucr.de conservare  5  Conservation felling 
25  de cring simplu  6  Coppice system felling  
26  de cring -cazanire  6  Coppice system felling including removal of stump 
27  de cring -scaun  6  Coppice system felling (1-1.5m above ground) 
28  de refacere  7  Clearcuts for forest type rehabilitation 
29  de substituire  7  Clearcuts for forest type substitution 
30  de ingrijire  8  Thinning 
31  igienizarea padurii  9  Sanitary felling 
32  t. de transformare in pasuni  10  Clearcuts in afforested pastures 
33  t. de rarire in pasuni impad.  10  Thinning in afforested pastures 
34  t. in aliniamente  11  Clearcuts of tree alignements 
35  t. de accidentale I  12  Salvage 
36  t. de accidentale II  12  Salvage 
Notes. Cod_taiere is the NFA ID code for a harvesting system.    54        
Table 12.  Preliminary Regression for Auctions held on April 20, 2002 & June 19, 2002 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Data points * Uncensored observations: 521  * Censored observations: 94. 
Valid cases:  615 
Missing cases:  0    Deletion method:   None 
Total SS:  56.091    Degrees of freedom:  609 
R-squared:  0.142   Rbar-squared:   0.135 
Residual SS:  48.102    Std error of est:    0.281 
F(5,609): 20.228   Probability  of  F:   0.000 
 
Standard     Prob   Stand.   Cor   
Variable   Estimate   Error   t-value   >|t|   Estimate   with  Y 
Constant   13.306   0.0733   181.49   0.000   ---   --- 
Volume      0.128   0.0187   6.86   0.000   0.5526       0.21 
Volume^2  -0.0123   0.0028   -4.46   0.000   -0.3550        0.11 
Area   -0.0625   0.0158   -3.96   0.000   -0.1539   -0.14 
Timber  Type  -0.0200   0.0243   -0.82   0.411   -0.0313   -0.08 
Cap.  Ratio  -1.668   0.3253   -5.13   0.000   -0.1956   -0.21 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes. The dependent variable is ln(Winning Bid per m
3) if the winning bid is more than 1.055 times the 
reservation price per m
3; otherwise, it is censored and replaced by 1.055 * reservation price per m
3. 
Volume is in m
3 /1000.  Volume
2 is in (m
3 /1000)
2. Area is in ha / 100. Only tracts with 100 cubic meters 
or more of timber are analyzed here. Timber Type is a dummy variable for Cod_produs = 5. CapRatio is 
the ratio of timber under contract divided by the annual authorized amount of timber for all firms who 
registered in an auction. Estimates above are used as starting values for estimating Models 1 and 2.   55        
 
Table 13A: Model 1: Parameters, Standard Errors, and MLE 
______________________________________________________ 
Parameter   Value    St.  error 
______________________________________________________ 
Sigma    0.696715  0.025895   
Constant    11.595983   0.430996   
Volume    0.011545  0.006752   
Area    -0.044298   0.009011   
Cap.  Ratio   -5.636284   1.146541   
______________________________________________________ 
Log Maximum likelihood = -7590.72 
 
 
Table 13B: Model 2: Parameters, Standard Errors, and MLE 
______________________________________________________ 
Parameter   Value    St.  error 
______________________________________________________ 
Sigma    0.658505  0.085333 
Constant    13.943434   0.280554 
Volume    -0.000753   0.020999 
Area    -0.162008   0.080215 
Cap.  Ratio   -9.784077   2.307241 
Gamma    1.235801  0.060740 
______________________________________________________ 
Log Maximum likelihood = -6901.56 
 
Notes. The dependent variable is ln(Winning Bid per m
3) if the winning bid is more than 1.055 times the 
reservation price per m
3; otherwise, it is censored and replaced by 1.055 * reservation price per m
3. 
Volume is in m
3 /1000.  Volume
2 is in (m
3 /1000)
2. Area is in ha / 100. Only tracts with 100 cubic meters 
or more of timber are analyzed here.  CapRatio is the ratio of timber under contract divided by the annual 
authorized amount of timber for all firms who registered in an auction. The dependent is assumed to be 
normally distributed and sigma is an estimate of its standard deviation.   56        
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Date  Organization, place  Person (name and/or position) 
19.06  ICAS, Bucharest  Mr Gheorghe Parnuta, general director 
Mr Ovidiu Badea and Mrs Simona Dragoi, forest 
management studies department 
25.06  Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forests, Waters, and 
Environment, Bucharest  
Mr Adrian Popa, chief, department of management of private 
forests 
25.06 (same)  Mrs  Carmen  Enescu, jurist 
1.07 (same)  Mr  Gheorghe  Marinescu, chief of forest fund department 
Mrs Maria Moise 
1.07 NFA  headquarters, 
Bucharest 
Mrs Simona Dabulean 
Mrs Celsea 
 
7.07 ITRSC  (forest 
inspectorate), Suceava 
Mr Melinte, chief 
Mr Radu Sbarna 
Mr Mihai Mihetiu 
Mr Sorin Popescu 
 
8.07 NFA  headquarters, 
Bucharest 
Mr Corduneanu, director, forest fund 
8.07   Department of External 
Trade, Bucharest 
Mr Gica Draganescu, director 
17.07  NFA Forest Directorate, 
Ialomita 
 
Mr Ioan Tatoi, director 
Mr Ioan Lorin, economist 
Mr Cozan, forest fund department 
18.07  NFA Forest Directorate, 
Timisoara 
Mr Francisc Toth, director 
Mr Baban, chief, forest fund department 
25.07  NFA Forest Directorate, 
Suceava 
Mr Marius Burciu 
Mr Iulian Stasiuc 





Mr Teodorescu, director  
21.08 Romanel,   
Piatra Neamt 
Mr Vasile Pupaza, chief of production department 
21.08 New  Star, 
Piatra Neamt 
Mr Viorel Mestecaneanu, executive manager 